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[845] 
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MCCARRAN 
AMENDMENT: AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE WHETHER 
CONGRESS INTENDED FOR STATE COURT JURISDICTION 
TO EXTEND TO INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS 
BY 
DYLAN R. HEDDEN-NICELY* 
The year 1976 marked a sea change in federal policy regarding the 
treatment of American Indian tribes and their water rights. In that year, 
the Supreme Court of the United States was called upon to determine 
the scope of the McCarran Amendment, a rider on a federal 
appropriations bill that waived the sovereign immunity of the United 
States in state court general stream adjudications “where it appears 
that the United States is the owner or is in the process of acquiring 
water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by 
exchange, or otherwise.” The Supreme Court, in what has been called a 
“clear example of judicial legislation,” interpreted that language to 
grant state court jurisdiction for the determination of Indian reserved 
water rights. In so doing, the Court abandoned the “deeply rooted” 
federal policy of “leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and 
control,” and has subjected the tribes to “hostile [state court] forums in 
which [the tribes] must be prepared to compromise their [water right] 
claims.”  
The purpose of this Article is to examine the legislative history of 
the McCarran Amendmentthe available Congressional Record, the 
Senate Report, as well as the Hearing Minutesin an effort to ascertain 
whether it was Congress’s intent to include Indian reserved water 
rights within the scope of the McCarran Amendment. 
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Funke & Associates, P.C. in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho. His practice focuses on the representation of 
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from the University of Idaho, College of Law with an emphasis in Native American Law and 
Natural Resources & Environmental Law. He also earned an M.S. from the University of Idaho 
in Water Resources - Science and Engineering. The Author would like to recognize and thank 
Professor Ramirose Attebury for her tireless work in helping the Author to locate and acquire 
the legislative history of the McCarran Amendment. He would also like to thank Professor 
Barbara Cosens for graciously giving her time, comments on this Article, and her continued 
support. 
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The legislative history indicates that “the McCarran Amendment 
was meant to be interpreted narrowly, not broadly.” It demonstrates 
that the Senators’ actual concern had not to do with federal reserved 
water rights but instead that the United States, acting in a proprietary 
rather than sovereign capacity, had been acquiring an ever-increasing 
number of state law water rights but was refusing to enter state court 
proceedings to either adjudicate or administer those rights. As the 
presense of the federal government increased in the river basins of the 
West, the proponents of the McCarran Amendment became increasinly 
alarmed that federal claims of sovereign immunity would effectively 
preclude state courts from enforcing state water law, thereby causing 
“the years of building the water laws of the Western States . . . [to] be 
seriously jeopardized.”  
Far from a general waiver, the legislative history reveals that the 
sponsors of the McCarran Amendment intended to address only this 
narrow but politically explosive problem where the United States was 
claiming a “privilege of immunity that the original owner wouldn’t 
have.” Indian reserved water rights, which are reserved by the federal 
government in its sovereign capacity for the benefit of Indian tribes that 
have sovereign immunity independent of the United States, do not 
appear to have been considered or intended to be included by Congress 
as the McCarran Amendment was passed into law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Between 1971 and 1983, the Supreme Court of the United States 
rendered three opinions that forever changed the legal landscape in Indian 
Country. In what has been called “a clear example of judicial legislation,”1 
the Court considered an obscure rider on an appropriations bill that came to 
be known as the McCarran Amendment,2 and found that it allowed for state 
	
 1  Mary Wallace, The Supreme Court and Indian Water Rights, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY 
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 197, 210 (Vine Deloria, Jr. ed., 1985). 
 2  Act of July 10, 1952, Pub. L. No. 495, § 208, 66 Stat. 549, 560 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666 
(2012)). In its entirety, the McCarran Amendment reads: 
(a) Joinder of United States as defendant; costs 
  Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the 
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the 
administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or 
is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, 
by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The 
United States, when a party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any 
right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not 
amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgments, 
orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in 
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United 
States in any such suit. 
(b) Service of summons 
  Summons or other process in any such suit shall be served upon the Attorney General 
or his designated representative. 
(c) Joinder in suits involving use of interstate streams by State 
  Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing the joinder of the United 
States in any suit or controversy in the Supreme Court of the United States involving the 
right of States to the use of the water of any interstate stream. 
Id. 
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court jurisdiction to determine federal and Indian reserved water rights.3 In 
so doing, “[t]he Court reviewed a legislative history that is inconclusive at 
best and created a new federal policy.”4 
The impact of the Court’s decisions cannot be overstated. The Supreme 
Court has long recognized a “deeply rooted” policy in the United States that 
Indian tribes and their rights are to be free from state court jurisdiction.5 
There is good reason for this: Indian tribes “owe no allegiance to the states, 
and receive from them no protection.”6 Nowhere has this maxim been more 
pronounced than in the determination of reserved water rights.7 The root of 
this treatment is that Indian tribes often have prior rights to water that has 
	
 3  See infra Part IV. 
 4  Wallace, supra note 1, at 210. 
 5  Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945). 
 6  United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). 
 7  See, e.g., In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River 
System (Big Horn I), 753 P.2d 76, 99–100 (Wyo. 1988) (reversing the finding of the Special 
Master that the purpose of the Wind River Reservation was to create a permanent homeland for 
Shoshone and Arapahoe Indians, and instead finding that the sole purpose of the reservation 
was agricultural, and that the Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908), doctrine does 
not include any rights to the use of groundwater); In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to 
Use Water in the Big Horn River System (Big Horn III), 835 P.2d 273, 279 (Wyo. 1992) (finding 
the Wind River tribes may not convert agricultural water rights to instream flow rights, despite 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit precedent expressly authorizing tribal 
changes in use, without complying with state law); Byers v. Wa-Wa-Ne, 169 P. 121, 128 (Or. 
1917) (limiting the water rights of the Umatilla Tribes to water necessary for domestic and 
livestock water rights); State ex rel. Martinez v. Lewis, 861 P.2d 235, 248–51 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) 
(awarding a water right for irrigated agriculture for just 2,322.4 acre-feet out of a claim by the 
Tribe of 17,750 acre-feet after imposing unprecedented market limits on certain crops used by 
the Mescalero Tribe in making its claim under the practicably irrigable acreage quantification 
standard); Wash. Dep’t of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Irrigation Dist., 850 P.2d 1306, 1310 
(Wash. 1993) (finding that although the Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakama Nation 
reserved a water right for fish with a time immemorial priority date, that right had been 
substantially diminished, and the Tribe was only entitled to a quantity for the “minimum 
instream flow necessary to maintain anadromous fish life in the river, according to annual 
prevailing conditions”) (the Yakima Nation renamed itself the Yakama Nation in the mid-1990s); 
In re SRBA (Snake River Basin Adjudication), No. 39576, Subcase No. 03-10022, slip op. at 47 
(Idaho Dist. Ct. Nov. 10, 1999) (finding the Nez Perce Tribe’s claims for instream flows for fish 
were inconsistent with the purpose of the Nez Perce Treaty of 1855, which guaranteed the Tribe 
the continued right of “taking fish at all usual and accustomed places,” as well as finding, 
despite federal court precedent to the contrary, that the Nez Perce Reservation had been 
diminished by an agreement between the United States and the Tribe in 1893); see also Robert 
H. Abrams, Reserved Water Rights, Indian Rights and the Narrowing Scope of Federal 
Jurisdiction: The Colorado River Decision, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1127 (1978) (examining the 
impact of state court jurisdiction on the determination of reserved water rights, and arguing the 
primary forum should continue to be federal courts because of the possibility of state bias, the 
tribal perception of state courts, the historical basis for special treatment of Indians, and the 
federal trust responsibility over Indian property); Scott B. McElroy & Jeff J. Davis, Revisiting 
Colorado River Conservation District v. United States—There Must be a Better Way, 27 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 597, 615 (1995); Michael C. Blumm et al., The Mirage of Indian Reserved Water Rights and 
Western Streamflow Restoration in the McCarran Amendment Era: A Promise Unfulfilled, 36 
ENVTL. L. 1157, 1160 (2006) [hereinafter Blumm et al., The Mirage of Indian Reserved Water 
Rights]; Michael C. Blumm et al., Judicial Termination of Treaty Water Rights: The Snake River 
Case, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 449, 450–452 (2000). 
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long been used by non-Indian appropriators.8 This creates conflict between 
tribal and non-Indian water users and the primary forum to resolve such 
conflict now rests in state courts that are “ill-equipped to deal with the 
political pressures arrayed against tribal efforts to reclaim water that ha[s] 
been used by the non-Indian community.”9 This pressure can cause state 
courts to develop “strong incentives to discriminate against federal claims in 
favor of state and private uses.”10 The ultimate outcome is that tribes are 
often forced “into hostile forums in which [they] must be prepared to 
compromise their claims.”11 
The question this Article addresses is whether Congress intended for 
this tectonic shift in federal policy regarding Indian tribes. It will explore the 
language and legislative history of the McCarran Amendment in an effort to 
ascertain its true purpose. 
That legislative history shows that “the McCarran Amendment was 
meant to be interpreted narrowly, not broadly.”12 Indeed, the language of the 
McCarran Amendment, together with its legislative history, suggests that the 
true policy underlying the McCarran Amendment was to address a narrow 
but politically unacceptable issue that was occurring throughout the West 
leading up to the early 1950s: the rapidly expanding United States 
government was acquiring state law water rights at an unprecedented rate 
but was refusing to be joined to state court proceedings that were seeking to 
	
 8  Abrams, supra note 7, at 1146 n.217. 
 9  McElroy & Davis, supra note 7, at 600. 
 10  Abrams, supra note 7, at 1111. 
 11  Blumm et al., The Mirage of Indian Reserved Water Rights, supra note 7, at 1161; see, e.g., 
United States v. State, 23 P.3d 117, 125–29 (Idaho 2001) (finding no water right for the 
reservation of ninety-five islands within the Deer Flat National Wildlife Refuge for the purposes 
of maintaining riparian habitat and to foster isolation of migratory birds from predators, despite 
acknowledging “[b]y definition an island is surrounded by some amount of water”); State v. 
United States, 12 P.3d 1284, 1286–91 (Idaho 2000) (finding that Congress did not imply a federal 
reserved water right for either the wilderness portion or the nonwilderness portion of the 
Sawtooth National Recreation Area, despite its stated purposes to “assure the preservation and 
protection of the natural, scenic, historic, pastoral, and fish and wildlife values and provide for 
the enhancement of the recreational values associated therewith” (quoting Act of Aug. 22, 1972, 
Pub. L. No. 92-400, § 1(a), 86 Stat. 612, 612 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460aa(a) (2012))); Potlatch 
Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260, 1263–68 (Idaho 2000) (finding that the Wilderness Act, 16 
U.S.C. §§1131–1136 (2012), reserved no water rights after having previously found the 
Wilderness Act had impliedly reserved all unappropriated flow (as of the creation of the areas) 
within Idaho’s three wilderness areas); United States v. City of Challis, 988 P.2d 1199, 1204–07 
(Idaho 1999) (finding that the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§528–531 
(2012), which broadened the purposes for which the national forests are to be managed, did not 
reserve “new” water rights because the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act did not create a new 
reservation of land); United States v. Jesse, 744 P.2d 491, 494–97 (Colo. 1987) (finding that 
Congress did not intend to reserve instream water rights for the purposes of securing sufficient 
water to furnish “a continuous supply of timber” for the San Isabel and Pike National Forests); 
United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 24–27 (Colo. 1982) (concluding that 
Congress did not intend to reserve “additional water for the existing national forests with a 1960 
priority date for recreational and wildlife conservation purposes” pursuant to the Multiple-Use 
Sustained-Yield Act, despite its broadening the purposes for which national forests are to be 
managed). 
 12  Wallace, supra note 1, at 210. 
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either adjudicate or administer those water rights. The proponents of the 
McCarran Amendment argued that the federal government’s claim of 
sovereign immunity precluded state courts from either initiating an 
adjudication or administering previously decreed water rights that were 
subsequently acquired by the United States.13 This, according to the 
proponents of the bill, effectively paralyzed the states’ ability to enforce 
their water laws because “all the supposedly settled water rights [were] 
subject to review and reexamination,” whenever “the United States 
appear[ed] in a watershed.”14 The upheaval caused by the federal 
government’s actions created considerable anxiety that “the long years of 
travail through which the water laws of our Western States have pased 
[sic] . . . have been in vain.”15 
The sponsors of the McCarran Amendment believed the federal claim of 
sovereign immunity unfair because, in those circumstances where it had 
acquired water rights pursuant to state law, the United States was acting in a 
proprietary rather than sovereign capacity but nonetheless claiming a 
“privilege of immunity that the original owner wouldn’t have.”16 It was this 
issue, which had nothing to do with Indian tribes whose rights are reserved 
by the United States in its sovereign capacity and who have sovereign 
immunity independent of the United States17 that was front and center as the 
McCarran Amendment was considered and passed into law. 
II. THE FUNDAMENTALS: RESERVED WATER RIGHTS VS. STATE LAW WATER RIGHTS 
A typical water user in the United States acquires his or her water rights 
pursuant to state rather than federal law. The history of this arrangement 
derives from a series of federal acts, which culminated with the Desert Land 
Act of 1877.18 The Desert Land Act allowed for federally-owned public 
domain “desert lands” within certain states to be acquired by United States 
citizens.19 However, the Act also contained the disclaimer: 
	
 13  S. REP. NO. 82-755, at 5 (1951). 
 14  A Bill to Authorize Suits Against the United States to Adjudicate and Administer Water 
Rights: Hearing on S. 18 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, United States 
Senate, 82d Cong. 22 (Apr. 25, Aug. 3–8, 1951) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Glen G. 
Saunders attorney representing the National Reclamation Association). 
 15  Id. at 48 (statement of W.T. Mathews, Att’y Gen. of the State of Nevada). 
 16  Id. at 8 (statement of Sen. Arthur V. Watkins (R-Utah)). 
 17  COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 7.05[1][a] (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) 
[hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]; see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004) 
(holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause, U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 2, did not preclude 
prosecution of the defendant by the federal government on the basis of his prior prosecution by 
the Spirit Lake Tribe because “the Tribe acted in its capacity of a separate sovereign”); United 
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331 (1978) (“Indian tribes are ‘distinct political communities’ 
with their own mores and laws . . . which can be enforced by formal criminal proceedings in 
tribal courts as well as by less formal means.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 18  Ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321–323 (2012)). 
 19  Id. § 1, 19 Stat. 377, 377 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 321 (2012)). 
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That the right to the use of water by the person . . . on or to any tract of desert 
land . . . shall depend upon bona fide prior appropriation; and such right shall 
not exceed the amount of water actually appropriated, and necessarily used for 
the purpose of irrigation and reclamation; and all surplus water over and above 
such actual appropriation and use, together with the water of all lakes, rivers, 
and other sources of water supply upon the public lands and not navigable, 
shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for 
irrigation, mining, and manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights.20 
Based upon this language, the United States Supreme Court determined 
that “following the act of 1877, if not before, all nonnavigable waters then a 
part of the public domain became publici juris, subject to the plenary control 
of the designated states.”21 
All arid and semi-arid states in the West have adopted some form of the 
prior appropriation doctrine.22 The prior appropriation doctrine is based 
upon the maxim that first-in-time is first-in-right: “[w]ater rights are ranked 
in the order that the right was acquired, and this priority schedule is used to 
distribute available water in times of shortage.”23 
The basis of a water right under the prior appropriation doctrine is 
beneficial use.24 The Supreme Court has described it this way: 
[O]ne acquires a right to water by diverting it from its natural source and 
applying it to some beneficial use. Continued beneficial use of the water is 
required in order to maintain the right. In periods of shortage, priority among 
confirmed rights is determined according to the date of initial diversion.25 
Thus, the quantity of appropriative rights is limited to the amount a 
person actually diverts and puts to a beneficial use.26 Prior appropriation 
jurisdictions apply the “use it or lose it” rule, meaning the water right is 
subject to forfeiture for nonuse.27 Finally, there is no shared shortage; in 
times of scarcity, the most senior user gets their entire quantity of water 
before the next most senior receives any water.28 
Reserved water rights are different. Reserved rights are one of two 
exceptions to the general rule of state plenary authority over water rights.29 
	
 20  Id. 
 21  Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163–64 (1935). 
 22  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 19.01[1]; A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS & 
RESOURCES § 5:3 (2016). 
 23  TARLOCK, supra note 22, § 5:32. 
 24  Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States (Colorado River), 424 U.S. 800, 805 
(1976). 
 25  Id.  
 26  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, §19.01[1]. 
 27  Id.; TARLOCK, supra note 22, § 5:90. 
 28  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, §19.01[1]. 
 29  See United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899) (“First, 
that, in the absence of specific authority from Congress, a state cannot, by its legislation, 
destroy the right of the United States as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the 
continued flow of its waters, so far, at least, as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the 
government property.”). The second exception is the navigational servitude. Id. Acts governing 
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The basis for reserved water rights for Indian tribes are the treaties, 
executive orders, congressionally ratified agreements, and other operative 
documents that were negotiated between the United States and each Indian 
Tribe for the creation of Indian reservations.30 Because reserved water rights 
are treaty rights, the United States and the tribes set them aside pursuant to 
their sovereign capacity.31 
Most agreements between Indian tribes and the United States are 
entirely silent regarding water rights. This silence was first addressed in 
Winters v. United States.32 That case involved the Fort Belknap Reservation, 
which was created by congressionally ratified agreement in 1888.33 However, 
the agreement did not discuss water rights.34 Shortly after the Reservation 
was created non-Indian irrigators began diverting water from the Milk River, 
which was a primary water supply for the Reservation.35 In 1905, a drought 
caused water supply to diminish below the amount necessary to supply both 
the tribes and the non-Indian irrigators, causing the United States to bring 
suit.36 
The non-Indian defendants argued that the silence in the Agreement as 
to water rights should be construed to mean that the tribes and United 
States did not intend for any water rights to be reserved along with the Fort 
Belknap Reservation.37 They argued the tribes should get their water by 
appropriation pursuant to the laws of the State of Montana and that since 
the non-Indians had begun using the water first, they were the prior 
appropriators.38 
The Court disagreed. It stated that “[t]he case, as we view it, turns on 
the agreement of May, 1888, resulting in the creation of Fort Belknap 
Reservation.”39 The Court then found: 
The Indians had command of the lands and the waters—command of all their 
beneficial use, whether kept for hunting, “and grazing roving herds of stock,” 
or turned to agriculture and the arts of civilization. Did they give up all this? 
Did they reduce the area of their occupation and give up the waters which 
made it valuable or adequate? . . . If it were possible to believe affirmative 
	
water and other rights on public lands do not extend to water use on federal reservations held 
by the United States. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 446–48 (1955). 
 30  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 19.03[1]. 
 31  E. DE VATTEL, 3 THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 160 (James 
Brown Scott, ed., Charles G. Fenwick trans., Press of Gibson Bros. 1916) (1758) (“A treaty . . . is 
a compact entered into by sovereigns for the welfare of the state. . . . Treaties can only be 
entered into by the highest State authorities, by sovereigns, who contract in the name of the 
State.”). 
 32  207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
 33  Id. at 567–68. 
 34  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 19.02. 
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Winters, 207 U.S. at 576 (“[I]t is contended, the means of irrigation were deliberately 
given up by the Indians and deliberately accepted by the Government.”).  
 38  Id. at 568–69.  
 39  Id. at 575. 
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answers, we might also believe that the Indians were awed by the power of the 
government or deceived by its negotiators. Neither view is possible.40 
The Court applied the Indian law canons of construction to imply a 
water right despite no express language in the agreement: 
By a rule of interpretation of agreements and treaties with the Indians, 
ambiguities occurring will be resolved from the standpoint of the Indians. And 
the rule should certainly be applied to determine between two inferences, one 
of which would support the purpose of the agreement and the other impair or 
defeat it.41 
The Court found that “[t]he power of the Government to reserve the 
waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not 
denied, and could not be.”42 Ultimately, the Court concluded that “the 
government did reserve them we have decided, and for a use which would 
be necessarily continued through years. This was done May 1, 1888.”43 
Winters v. United States forms the basis for what is now known as the 
Winters doctrine. Winters rights are owned by the United States in trust for 
the tribes44 and are determined pursuant to federal rather than state law.45 
The doctrine is one of implied rights; the intent to reserve water “is inferred 
if the previously unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish the 
purposes for which the reservation was created.”46 The doctrine originally 
applied only to Indian tribes but was subsequently applied to non-Indian 
federal reservations as well.47 Critical to the legislative history discussion to 
come: since these rights were reserved pursuant to treaty, the United States 
reserved them in its sovereign rather than proprietary capacity.48 
The primary difference between state law water rights and reserved 
water rights under the Winters doctrine is that “[u]nlike appropriation rights, 
reserved rights are not based on diversion and actual beneficial use. Instead, 
sufficient water is reserved to fulfill the purposes for which a reservation 
	
 40  Id. at 576. 
 41  Id. at 576–77. 
 42  Id. at 577. 
 43  Id. 
 44  Id. 
 45  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 19.05[1]. 
 46  Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 139 (1976). Cappaert also held that reserved 
water rights may be expressed rather than implied. Id.  
 47  See id. at 138, 141 (applying the doctrine of implied rights to a tract of land surrounding 
Devil’s Hole, a detached component of the Death Valley National Monument, to preserve a rare 
species of desert fish); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963) (recognizing that the 
doctrine of implied rights extends to National Recreation Areas and National Forests). Notice 
that the first time the Winters doctrine was applied to a non-Indian federal reservation was a 
full ten years after the passage of the McCarran Amendment. This important point begs the 
question of how the framers of the McCarran Amendment could have intended its scope to 
include something they did not know existed. 
 48  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 19.03[4]. 
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was established.”49 This necessarily includes water for current and future 
needs.50 As a result, reserved rights “may be asserted at any time; and they 
are not lost through nonuse.”51 Further, reserved rights, just like state law 
rights, have a priority date: 
But the priority of reserved rights is no later than the date on which a 
reservation was established, which in the case of most Indian reservations in 
the West, is earlier than the priority of most non-Indian water rights. Thus, a 
reservation established in 1865 that starts putting water to use for agricultural 
purposes in 1981 under its reserved rights has, in times of shortage, a priority 
that is superior to any non-Indian water right with a state law priority acquired 
after 1865. For these reasons, Indian rights are generally prior and paramount 
to rights derived under State law.52 
Because Indian reserved water rights are invariably prior to state law 
rights, the quantity Indian tribes are entitled to is potentially large, and 
because tribal rights “are often put to actual use long after appropriation 
rights are established, the exercise of tribal water rights has the potential to 
disrupt non-Indian water uses.”53 As a result, “[t]o the extent that reserved 
rights can be narrowly construed, important state economic interests are 
served . . . . Thus, state judges in water rights adjudications will be under 
strong pressure to rule against the federal government’s reserved rights 
claims.”54 This pressure creates a risk that “state courts may prove incapable 
of protecting the important federal policies that underlie the reserved rights 
doctrine and will deprive the United States and Indian groups of vital water 
rights.”55 This existential threat to reserved rights is the reason for the 
“deeply rooted” federal policy “of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction 
and control.”56 
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE DETERMINATION OF INDIAN WATER RIGHTS 
BEFORE THE MCCARRAN AMENDMENT 
Indian tribes, like the United States, enjoy sovereign immunity.57 
Sovereign immunity is a doctrine that precludes lawsuits against the 
	
 49  Id. § 19.01[1]. 
 50  Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 601. 
 51  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 19.01[1]. 
 52  Id. (footnote omitted). But see, United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1362–63 (9th 
Cir. 1983) (restricting the priority date for some irrigation water rights appurtenant to certain 
lands within the reservation that had that had been sold to non-Indians and subsequently 
reacquired by the Tribe). 
 53  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 19.03[1]. 
 54  Abrams, supra note 7, at 1131–32. 
 55  Id. at 1131. 
 56  Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945). 
 57  See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2028 (2014) (“Among the core 
aspects of sovereignty that tribes possess . . . is the ‘common-law immunity from suit 
traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.’” (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 
49, 58 (1978))); Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998) (applying 
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sovereign absent its consent.58 “The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is 
rooted in federal common law and reflects the federal Constitution’s 
treatment of Indian tribes as governments in the Indian commerce clause.”59 
Only Congress may waive the sovereign immunity of the United States, 
and that waiver “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.”60 
Likewise, tribal sovereign immunity may only be waived by the tribal council 
or abrogated by Congress.61 Congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign 
immunity once again “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally 
expressed.”62 Similarly, a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity by a tribal 
council “must be ‘clear.’”63 
The policy considerations supporting tribal sovereign immunity are 
manifold. Tribal sovereign immunity is “a necessary corollary to Indian 
sovereignty and self-governance.”64 The doctrine protects treaty rights and 
	
tribal sovereign immunity to preclude suits against Indian tribes even for tribal conduct 
occurring off-reservation); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 
498 U.S. 505, 509–10 (1991) (holding that a suit filed by Potawatomi tribe for an injunction 
against the Oklahoma Tax Commission did not waive the sovereign immunity of the Tribe with 
respect to counterclaim filed by the Commission to enforce its tax code); Santa Clara Pueblo, 
436 U.S. at 58–59 (holding that the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1341 (2012), did 
not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity for tribal members to sue their tribes in federal court 
over alleged civil rights violations); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 
173 (1977) (“[C]ertainly, the mere fact that the Tribe has appeared on behalf of its individual 
members does not affect a waiver of sovereign immunity for the Tribe itself.”); United States v. 
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512–13 (1940) (finding prior decree affirming a cross-action 
against the United States acting as trustee for the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations void and 
subject to collateral attack because neither the United States nor the Tribes had waived their 
sovereign immunity to a cross-action by initiating a lawsuit); Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 
354, 357–58 (1919) (“Like other governments . . . the Creek Nation was free from liability for 
injuries to persons or property due to mob violence or failure to keep the peace.”). 
 58  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 7.05[1][a] (“Indian tribes are immune from lawsuits 
or court process in both state and federal court unless ‘Congress has authorized the suit or the 
tribe has waived its immunity.’” (quoting Kiowa Tribe of Okla., 523 U.S. at 754)). A notable 
exception to this general rule is the Ex parte Young doctrine, which allows suits for specific 
relief against federal officials acting outside the scope of their authority or pursuant to an 
unconstitutional statute. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908). The Supreme Court has 
indicated the Ex parte Young doctrine may be applicable to tribal officials acting in their official 
capacity as well. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 7.05[1][a] (citing Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 
U.S. at 59). 
 59  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 7.05[1][a] (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). 
 60  United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969). 
 61  Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 754 (“As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit 
only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity”). 
 62  Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58–59 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 
(1972)). 
 63  C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 418 
(2001) (quoting Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 
505, 509 (1991)). 
 64  Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 
890 (1986). 
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resources, which the United States has a duty to protect.65 Sovereign 
immunity serves as a critical shield that “protects tribes’ often weak 
economic foundations from erosion by eliminating costs associated with 
defending lawsuits; it is therefore critical to the development of strong tribal 
economics and other tribal and federal interests.”66 
Sovereign immunity traditionally kept Indian tribes and their water 
rights out of state court. Before 1976, the United States would “proceed . . . 
as plaintiffs or . . . appear specially” in order to “evidence to the court the 
interest [of the United States].”67 Ultimately, “the matter [would be] settled 
on the basis of stipulating [the federal] rights as they relate to all others,”68 
and “a decree is entered recognizing those interests.”69 This process typically 
gave Indian tribes control of when and where its rights would be quantified.70 
It allowed tribes to develop the funding necessary to engage in a water rights 
adjudication.71 Further, since these adjudications were not typically general 
adjudications, the number of parties involved was more manageable and 
	
 65  Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under 
Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of 
American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 688 (2002). 
 66  Id. at 739. 
 67  Hearings, supra note 14, at 3 (statement of William H. Veeder, Special Assistant to the 
Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
 68  Id.  at 3. 
 69  Id. at 4. 
 70  An unfortunate exception to this general proposition arises when the United States, 
against whom tribes do not have sovereign immunity, initiates lawsuits for the adjudication of 
tribal rights without the consent or participation of the tribes. For example, the United States 
initiated a federal court water rights adjudication in 1913 on behalf of both the Pyramid Lake 
Paiute as well as the Newlands Reclamation Project. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 116 
(1983). The Pyramid Lake Paiute were not a party to the adjudication. The United States 
“claimed 10,000 cubic feet of water per second for the project and a claim to 500 cubic feet per 
second for the Reservation.” Id. 500 cubic feet per second was not sufficient for the Tribe’s 
needs, and it became apparent the United States favored its fiduciary obligations to the federal 
irrigation project over those of the Tribe. Id. at 116, 119, 141. Nonetheless, when the United 
States attempted to later claim additional water on behalf of the Tribe, the Supreme Court 
found it was barred by res judicata. Id. at 145. This case hails from a different era when the 
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes looked much different than today. It 
nonetheless underscores the many competing interests of the United States and the need for 
tribal involvement in water rights adjudications to adequately protect tribal interests. 
 71  The fact that the water rights of an Indian tribe may be haled into state court at any time 
has drastic impacts on tribal economic development. Although the United States enters 
adjudications on behalf of the tribes, the national policies often take precedence over the needs 
of an individual tribe. Because of this, tribes are often compelled to hire their own legal counsel 
to ensure their rights and interests are adequately represented. However, it is “the policy of the 
Department of the Interior not to use federally appropriated funds to pay for private counsel to 
represent Indian tribes.” 25 C.F.R. § 89.40 (2015). Although there are exceptions to that policy, 
id. § 89.41, tribes typically pay a large portion of the costs to defend their water rights in state 
court. This places the tribes, often the poorest communities in the nation, in an impossible 
position. They can repurpose funds often earmarked for economic development to their water 
rights effortassuming such funds existor they can rely upon the United States to sufficiently 
protect their rights.  
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could be litigated in less time and at less expense.72 Most importantly, it 
allowed the tribes to make their case in federal court. 
It was against the backdrop of this firmly entrenched precedent that the 
Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the scope of the McCarran 
Amendment included the reserved water rights of the United States and 
America’s Indian tribes. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE MCCARRAN AMENDMENT 
The Supreme Court’s slow expansion of the McCarran Amendment took 
place over twelve years and three decisions. The process began with United 
States v. District Court73 (Eagle County), wherein the Court found that non-
Indian federal reserved water rights for the White River National Forest 
were included within the scope of the McCarran Amendment.74 The Court’s 
analysis turned on an examination of section (a) of the McCarran 
Amendment,75 which states in part: 
	
 72  In comparison, general adjudications are massive undertakings. For example, Idaho’s 
Snake River Basin Adjudication commenced in 1987, and the final unified decree was entered 
on August 25, 2014, and contained 158,591 water right decrees. Clive J. Strong, SRBA 
Retrospective: A 27-Year Effort, ADVOCATE, Nov./Dec. 2014, at 28, 28 (Idaho State Bar). Of those, 
about 130,500 partial decrees were based upon state law and about 15,000 were disallowed state 
law water rights and claims. Id. It also contained 1,346 water right decrees based upon federal 
law. Id. Importantly, approximately 11,700 additional federal law claims were disallowed. Id. In 
coming to this final decree, the court handled 43,822 contested cases, the Idaho Supreme Court 
issued 36 opinions, and the United States Supreme Court issued one opinion. Id. The SRBA is 
said to have been the fastest of its kind. Adjudications in Wyoming and Washington took 
approximately 37 years to determine 25,000 and 3,000 claims respectively. Id. Meanwhile, the 
Montana general stream adjudication, which commenced in 1979 and expects to include 
approximately 219,000 water right claims, is not expected to conclude until 2028. Id. at 29 n.2. 
Similarly, in Arizona, approximately 82,000 claims have been filed in the Gila River 
Adjudication, which commenced in 1974 and is currently about 33% completed. Id. at 29 n.3. 
Likewise, the Little Colorado Adjudication commenced in 1978 in Arizona state court, contains 
around 14,000 claims, and is approximately 55% complete. Id. The Arizona adjudications have 
been called a “procedural nightmare.” McElroy & Davis, supra note 7, at 613. New Mexico has 
thirteen adjudications currently ongoing, all of which were commenced between 1956 and 1970. 
Strong, supra note 72, at 29 n.4.  
 73  401 U.S. 520 (1971). A companion case to Eagle County was United States v. District 
Court (Water Division No. 5), 401 U.S. 527 (1971). However, the Court’s analysis in that decision 
was limited primarily to referencing Eagle County. Id. at 529. Although additional issues were 
raised, they were limited to specific questions regarding Colorado’s adjudication procedures.  
 74  Eagle County, 401 U.S. at 522–23. 
 75  Id. at 523–24. Both the United States and the respondents briefed the legislative history 
of the McCarran Amendment in Eagle County. The United States argued that the legislative 
history supported the conclusion that the Amendment only implicated state law water rights. 
Brief for Petitioner at 24–30, Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (No. 87). The respondents, on the other 
hand, argued the legislative history included all water rights owned by the United States, 
including reserved rights. Brief for Respondents and Intervenors at 11–39, Eagle County, 401 
U.S. 520 (No. 87). The Respondent’s arguments were based primarily upon: remarks regarding 
sections of the bill that were not ultimately adopted, statements made by the representatives 
from the Departments of Interior and Justice, as well as a remark made by Senator McCarran 
indicating that purpose of the Amendment was to provide certainty that all water rights in a 
particular basin were comprehensively determined. Id. Ultimately, the Supreme Court did not 
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  Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for 
the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, 
or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United 
States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by 
appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the 
United States is a necessary party to such suit.76 
The Court began by splitting section (a)(1) from the remaining language 
in the Amendment and reading it in isolation. Although section (a)(1) does 
nothing more than define one of the two types of proceedings wherein the 
United States has waived its sovereign immunitya general stream 
adjudicationthe Supreme Court concluded the language “‘rights to the use 
of water of a river system’ is broad enough to embrace ‘reserved’ waters.”77 
Based upon this interpretation of section (a)(1), the Court concluded that 
the McCarran Amendment “would seem to be all-inclusive.”78 
The Court then turned to section (a)(2). It read the remaining language 
as a single provision and then concluded “[t]his provision does not qualify 
§ 666(a)(1), for (1) and (2) are separated by an ‘or.’”79 However, just two 
sentences later, the Court concluded “‘the administration of such rights’ in 
§ 666(a)(2) must refer to the rights described in [a](1) for they are the only 
ones which, in this context ‘such’ could mean; and, as we have seen, they are 
all-inclusive.”80 In other words, the Court concluded that although the 
limiting language found after section (a)(2) did not apply to section (a)(1), 
the “all-inclusive” language found in section (a)(1) expanded the more 
limited language in section (a)(2). 
This enabled the Court to reject the United States’ application of the 
doctrine of ejusdem generis to argue that the McCarran Amendment was 
only applicable to the adjudication of state law rights. Ejusdem generis 
applies “when specific words are followed by a general term such as ‘or 
otherwise’ and works to limit the objects encompassed by the general term 
to the same class as those specifically enumerated.”81 The Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the terms “by appropriation under state law,” “by 
purchase,” and “by exchange,” “would normally be appropriative rights.”82 As 
such, ejusdem generis should have required the term “or otherwise,” be 
limited to other forms of state law rights. However, the Court refused to 
apply ejusdem generis to section (a)(1) because, as they read it, section 
	
seem to rely upon any legislative history, opting instead to engage in a pure statutory 
construction analysis in coming to its conclusion that the McCarran Amendment included non-
Indian federal reserved water rights.  
 76  43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2012). 
 77  Eagle County, 401 U.S. at 523. 
 78  Id.  
 79  Id. at 524. 
 80  Id.  
 81  James W. Dilworth & Frederic I. Kirgis, Jr., Comment, Adjudication of Water Rights 
Claimed by the United States–Application of Common-Law Remedies and the McCarran 
Amendment of 1952, 48 CAL. L. REV. 94, 110 (1960); see also NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 
2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (7th ed. 2015). 
 82  Eagle County, 401 U.S. at 524. 
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(a)(1) was not qualified by the language found after section (a)(2). This 
allowed the Court to conclude that, “we deal with an all-inclusive statute 
concerning ‘the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system, 
which, in § 666(a)(1), has no exceptions and which, as we read it, includes 
appropriative rights, riparian rights, and reserved rights.’”83 
Eagle County did not involve Indian water rights, but, just five years 
later the State of Colorado returned to the Supreme Court in Colorado River 
Water Conservation District v. United States84 (Colorado River), to ask it to 
determine “whether the McCarran Amendment provided consent to 
determine federal reserved rights held on behalf of Indians in state court.”85 
The Court “conclude[d] that the state court had jurisdiction over Indian 
water rights under the Amendment.”86 
In so determining, the Court did away with the confusing and 
convoluted statutory analysis from Eagle County and instead simply found 
that: 
[Eagle County] held that the provisions of the McCarran Amendment . . . 
subject federal reserved water rights to general adjudication in state 
proceedings . . . . More specifically, the Court held that reserved rights were 
included in those rights where the United States was ‘otherwise’ the owner.87 
Now having apparently acknowledged that the “or otherwise” language did 
apply to section (a)(1) of the McCarran Amendment, the Court did not go 
back and analyze whether ejusdem generis should limit that general term to 
state law rights, consistent with the specific terms listed “by purchase” and 
“by exchange.” 
While the Court acknowledged that “Eagle County . . . did not involve 
reserved rights on Indian reservations,”88 it nonetheless failed to apply the 
“eminently sound and vital canon” of interpretation that ambiguities in 
federal statutes affecting Indian tribes are “to be liberally construed [with] 
doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians.”89 That canon 
	
 83  Id. 
 84  424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
 85  Id. at 809. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. at 810 (citing Eagle County, 401 U.S. at 524).  
 88  Id.  
 89  Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392–93 (1976) (quoting N. Cheyenne Tribe v. 
Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 655 n.7 (1976) and Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 
78, 89 (1918)); see also County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes Bands of the Yakima Indian 
Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992) (“When we are faced with these two possible constructions [of 
a statute], our choice between them must be dictated by a principle deeply rooted in this 
Court’s Indian Jurisprudence: ‘[S]tatutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, 
with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting 
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985))); N. Cheyenne Tribe, 425 U.S. at 656 
(reaffirming the “judicially fashioned canon of construction that these statutes are to be read to 
reserve Congress’s powers [to abrogate tribal rights] in the absence of a clear expression by 
Congress to the contrary”); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 170–71, 174–75 
(1973) (determining that unless expressly provided by Congress, state laws are generally not 
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did not apply in Eagle County because no tribe was involved but was 
necessary in Colorado River. However, the Court ignored this longstanding 
precedent and found that “viewing the Government’s trusteeship of Indian 
rights as ownership, the logic of [Eagle County] clearly extends to such 
rights.”90 
The Court concluded that Congress intended for the McCarran 
Amendment to include Indian reserved water rights because the “underlying 
policy [of the McCarran Amendment] dictates a construction including 
Indian rights in its provisions.”91 The Court found the policy of the 
Amendment was to be “an all-inclusive statute concerning the adjudication 
of rights to the use of a river system . . . [t]his consideration applies as well 
to federal water rights reserved for Indian reservations.”92 
The Court could point to no express legislative history that indicated 
Congress intended for the Amendment’s waiver to include Indian water 
rights.93 Instead it pointed to a statement from the Senate report that 
indicated that “[i]n the administration and the adjudication of water rights 
under State laws . . . all water users on a stream, in practically every case, 
are interested and necessary parties to any court proceedings.”94 The Court 
ignored the plain language of the Senate report that clearly limited its scope 
to water rights acquired under state law. Instead, the Court argued that the 
“ubiquitous nature of Indian water rights in the Southwest,” leads to the 
	
applicable to Indians on a reservation, and any ambiguity should be interpreted in favor of the 
Indians); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1956) (“Doubtful expressions are to be resolved 
in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon 
its protection and good faith.” (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832))); 
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1930) (“[I]n general tax exemptions are not to be 
presumed and statutes conferring them are to be strictly construed . . . the contrary is the rule 
to be applied to tax exemptions secured to the Indians . . . . Such provisions are to be liberally 
construed”); Alaska Pac. Fisheries, 248 U.S. at 89 (stating as a “general rule[,] that statutes 
passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes or communities are to be liberally construed, 
doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians”); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 
(1912) (holding that statutory “construction . . . is liberal; doubtful expressions . . . are to be 
resolved in favor [of the Indians]”). 
 90  Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 810. 
 91  Id.  
 92  Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 93  A review of the briefing in Colorado River demonstrates that although the United States 
analyzed the legislative history, it did not analyze whether the legislative history demonstrated 
that Congress intended for the McCarran Amendment to include reserved water rights held in 
trust for Indian tribes. Brief of the United States at 22–30, Colorado River, 424 U.S. 800 (Nos. 74-
940, 74-949). Instead, the federal analysis of the legislative history primarily focused on the 
separate question of whether the McCarran Amendment precluded the United States from 
initiating water rights adjudications in federal court. Id. In contrast, the Colorado River Water 
Conservation District extensively briefed the legislative history of the McCarran Amendment, 
highlighting the few places in that history that indicated Indian reserved water rights were 
included within the Amendment’s scope. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 15–30, Colorado River, 
424 U.S. 800 (Nos. 74-940, 74-949). Those instances included the language of the Senate Report 
and the remarks of the Department of the Interior that the Supreme Court ultimately cited to 
support its conclusion that the McCarran Amendment included Indian reserved water rights. 
 94  Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 810–11 (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-755, at 4–5 
(1951)). 
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conclusion that “a construction of the Amendment excluding those rights . . . 
would enervate the Amendment’s objective.”95 The Court then concluded its 
analysis of the legislative history with a negative inference, stating that “the 
Senate report on the Amendment took note of a recommendation in a 
Department of the Interior report that no consent to suit be given as to 
Indian rights and rejected the recommendation.”96 Based upon this scant 
legislative history, the Court concluded that the “underlying policy” of the 
Amendment “dictates a construction including Indian rights.”97 A curious 
conclusion from a Court that, a few weeks later, would require “some 
[affirmative] mention” by Congress where “such a sweeping change in the 
status of tribal government and reservation Indians [is allegedly] 
contemplated by Congress.”98 
The final case, Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona,99 (San 
Carlos Apache Tribe) was decided seven years later. There, the Court 
addressed the question of whether “concurrent federal suits brought by [the 
San Carlos Apache Tribe and the Northern Cheyenne], rather than by the 
United States, and raising only Indian claims, [are] subject to dismissal 
under the doctrine of Colorado River?”100 The Tribes and the United States 
made several arguments that a stay of their federal suit would not be 
appropriate: 
(1) Indian rights have traditionally been left free of interference from the 
States. (2) State courts may be inhospitable to Indian rights. (3) The McCarran 
Amendment, although it waived United States sovereign immunity in state 
comprehensive water adjudications, did not waive Indian sovereign immunity. . 
. . (4) Indian water rights claims are generally based on federal rather than 
state law. (5) Because Indian water claims are based on the doctrine of 
‘reserved rights’ and take priority over most water rights created by state law, 
they need not, as a practical matter, be adjudicated inter sese with other water 
rights, and could simply be incorporated into the comprehensive state decree 
at the conclusion of the state proceedings.101 
	
 95  Id. at 811. 
 96  Id. at 812. 
 97  Id. at 810. 
 98  Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 381 (1976). The Court in Bryan was asked to 
determine whether the Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 4, 67 Stat. 588, 589 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012)), granted congressional authorization for states to tax tribal 
trust lands. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 375. In determining that it did not, Justice Brennan, who also 
authored the Court’s decision in Colorado River, found that “the total absence of congressional 
intent [in either the text or legislative history of the Act of Aug 15, 1953] . . . has significance in 
the application of the canons of construction applicable to statutes affecting Indian 
immunities.” Id. at 381. Justice Brennan concluded that “some mention would normally be 
expected if such a sweeping change in the status of tribal government and reservation Indians 
had been contemplated by Congress.” Id. 
 99  463 U.S. 545 (1983). 
 100  Id. at 549. 
 101  Id. at 567–67. 
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The Court found that while “[e]ach of these arguments has a good deal 
of force . . . [they all] founder on one crucial fact: If the state proceedings 
have jurisdiction over the Indian water rights at issue here, as appears to be 
the case, then concurrent federal proceedings are likely to be duplicative 
and wasteful, generating ‘additional litigation through permitting 
inconsistent dispositions of property.’”102 
Although the Court pointed out that “the fact that a federal suit was 
brought by Indians on their own behalf and sought only to adjudicate Indian 
rights should be figured into the balance,”103 it nevertheless determined that 
adjudication of Indian rights in federal court “will be neither practical nor 
wise as long as it creates the possibility of duplicative litigation, tension and 
controversy between the federal and state forums, hurried and pressured 
decisionmaking, and confusion over the disposition of property rights.”104 
Ultimately, the Court found that “the most important consideration in any 
federal water suit concurrent to a comprehensive state proceeding,” was not 
its “deeply rooted” policy of “leaving the Indians free from state 
jurisdiction,”105 but instead “must be ‘the policy underlying the McCarran 
Amendment’” of avoiding piecemeal litigation.106 
Both the Tribe and the United States argued against this by pointing to a 
seemingly reasonable solution: the federal court can determine the Indian 
water rights while the state court determines the non-Indian federal rights 
and state law rights.107 Once the Indian rights are determined, they could be 
incorporated into the final state decree.108 In answer to this suggestion, the 
Court stated “[t]he problem with these scenarios, however, is that they 
assume a cooperative attitude on the part of the state courts, state 
legislatures, and state parties which is neither legally required nor 
realistically always to be expected.”109 In other words, the Court implicitly 
reaffirmed its long held understanding that Indian tribes “receive . . . no 
protection” from the states or their courts.110 However, rather than using this 
as a reason to narrowly construe state court jurisdiction over Indian tribes, 
as it normally would, the Supreme Court used it in this case as a reason to 
liberally construe state court jurisdiction to the detriment of the tribal 
parties. 
The Supreme Court concluded by reiterating: 
  We also emphasize, as we did in Colorado River, that our decision in no way 
changes the substantive law by which Indian rights in state water adjudications 
must be judged. State courts, as much as federal courts, have a solemn 
obligation to follow federal law. Moreover, any state court decision alleged to 
	
 102  Id. at 567 (footnote omitted) (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819). 
 103  Id. at 569. 
 104  Id. 
 105  Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945). 
 106  San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 569 (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820). 
 107  Id. at 568. 
 108  Id. 
 109  Id. at 568–69. 
 110  United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). 
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abridge Indian water rights protected by federal law can expect to receive, if 
brought for review before this Court, a particularized and exacting scrutiny 
commensurate with the powerful federal interests in safeguarding those rights 
from state encroachment.111 
The Court’s decision that the “or otherwise” language in the McCarran 
Amendment includes reserved water rights was ultimately driven by its 
conclusion that the policy underlying the McCarran Amendment was to be 
an “all-inclusive statute concerning the adjudication of rights to the use of a 
river system”112 in order to avoid piecemeal litigation.113 However, the 
legislative history suggests the intent was for the McCarran Amendment to 
be much narrower in scope. 
V. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE TRUE POLICY UNDERLYING THE MCCARRAN 
AMENDMENT 
To support its ultimate conclusions in Colorado River, the Supreme 
Court relied upon two facets of the legislative history: statements from 
representatives of the executive branch and a single out-of-context 
statement from the Senate Report that “[i]n the administration of and the 
adjudication of water rights under State laws . . . all water users on a stream, 
in practically every case, are interested and necessary parties to any court 
proceedings.”114 However, this “legislative history . . . is inconclusive at 
best.”115 This alone should have directed a different result in light of the 
Supreme Court’s “eminently sound and vital canon[s]”116 that statutes 
affecting Indian tribes “be liberally construed, [with] doubtful expressions 
being resolved in favor of the Indians.”117 Furthermore, none of the legislative 
history cited by the Court contained any affirmative statement that Congress 
intended for the waiver to include reserved rights. One would expect at least 
“some mention . . . if such a sweeping change in the status of tribal 
government and reservation Indians had been contemplated by Congress.”118 
However, most importantly, the legislative historywhen considered as a 
wholedoes not seem to support the Supreme Court’s ultimate conclusions. 
Instead, it demonstrates that “the McCarran Amendment was meant to be 
interpreted narrowly, not broadly.”119 
The legislative history of the McCarran Amendmentoften referred to 
as S. 18can be broken into four component parts. First, the record 
	
 111  San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 571. 
 112  Id. at 550–51 (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. 800, 810 (1976)). 
 113  Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 823. 
 114  Id. at 810–12 (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-755, at 4–5 (1951)).  
 115  Wallace, supra note 1, at 210. 
 116  Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (quoting N. Cheyenne Tribe v. 
Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 655 n.7 (1976)).  
 117  Id. (quoting Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918)); see also cases 
cited supra note 89. 
 118  Bryan, 426 U.S. at 381. 
 119  Wallace, supra note 1, at 210. 
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contains information regarding a number of events that led to and 
precipitated the call for the development of the McCarran Amendment.120 
These events are important because they drove the development of the law, 
and therefore interpretation of the McCarran Amendment should be 
considered through the context of those events. Second, the Senate held 
three days of hearings, headed by Senator Arthur V. Watkins (R-Utah).121 In 
addition to those hearings, the bill was debated on the floor of the Senate by 
Senator Pat McCarran (D-Nev.).122 The hearings and the debate are rich with 
statements made by the Senators, as well as both the proponents and 
opponents of the proposed bill, which are very probative as to the purpose 
and intent behind the bill. Third, the Senate published a report on the 
proposed bill.123 Finally, the executive branch, through the Department of 
Justice and Department of the Interior, provided their interpretation of the 
effect of the bill.124 The executive branch’s analysis of the bill is important 
because it was a primary factor in the Supreme Court’s examination of the 
legislative history of the McCarran Amendment. It also exposes a tension 
between the executive branch and Senate in their respective interpretation 
of the McCarran Amendment. 
A. The Events that Led to the Call for Congressional Action 
The Congressional Record contains mention of three separate water 
controversies, all in the West, that seem to have precipitated the 
development of the McCarran Amendment. These controversies arose on the 
Quinn River in Nevada (Senator McCarran’s home state), in several 
adjudications in Colorado, and in the Santa Margarita River watershed in 
California. Importantly, in all three cases, the United States had acquired 
state law water rights through either purchase or by appropriation under 
state law, and then proceeded to use its sovereign immunity to preclude any 
state court adjudication or administration of those rights. This irresponsible 
and unfair practice acted to paralyze the state courts’ ability to control state 
law water rights in those basins, which created significant political backlash 
against the United States and likely resulted in Congress taking action and 
passing the McCarran Amendment. 
	
 120  See infra Part V.A. 
 121  See infra Part V.B.1. 
 122  See infra Part V.B.2. 
 123  See infra Part V.C. 
 124  See infra Part V.D. 
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1. The Quinn River, Nevada: The United States Purchases State Law Rights 
but Refuses State Court Jurisdiction 
The Quinn River is a small intermittent river located in the 
northwestern portion of Senator McCarran’s home state of Nevada.125 It is 
approximately 100 miles long and has a drainage area of approximately 6,710 
square miles.126 However, the region is very arid and water is scarce in the 
Quinn River watershed. In 2015, the Quinn River had an average annual 
discharge of approximately eight cubic-feet-per-second (cfs), as measured at 
the United States Geological Survey Gage located near McDermitt, Nevada.127 
The flows drop to around two cfs between July and September.128 
The relative scarcity of water in this watershed has long caused 
controversy.129 An adjudication of the water rights in the basin commenced 
in 1907.130 “Several years after the entry of the decree the United States, 
through the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, United 
States Government, purchased certain lands and water rights on the Quinn 
River.”131 After the United States purchased these rights, a dispute arose 
regarding the decree: 
[The Indian Service], as user of said three water rights and lands . . . was made 
party defendant by order of the State court. . . . The Indian service objected to 
the jurisdiction of the State court, notwithstanding its water rights had 
theretofore been adjudicated by that court, prior of course to the purchase 
thereof by the United States . . . .132 
The United States removed the case to federal court, which held the 
sovereign immunity of the United States precluded state court jurisdiction.133 
	
 125  U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Quinn River Valley 100K Quad, 
http://www.nv.blm.gov/LandRecords/map.php?quad=quinn_river_valley (last visited Nov. 19, 
2016). 
 126  U.S. Geological Survey, Boundary Descriptions and Names of Regions, Accounting 
United and Cataloging Units, http://water.usgs.gov/GIS/huc_name.html (last visited Nov. 19, 
2016). 
 127  U.S. Geological Survey, USGS Surface-Water Annual Statistics for Nevada, 
http://waterdata.usgs.gov/nv/nwis/annual/?referred_module=sw&amp;site_no=103530001&amp;
por_103530001_103017=2692792,00060,103017,2014,2016&amp;year_type=W&amp;format=html
_table&amp;date_format=YYYY-MM-DD&amp;rdb_compression=file&amp;submitted_form 
=parameter_selection_list (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) (U.S. Geological Survey Gage No. 
103530001).  
 128  U.S. Geological Survey, USGS Surface-Water Monthly Statistics for the Nevada, 
http://waterdata.usgs.gov/nv/nwis/monthly/?referred_module=sw&amp;site_no=103530001&am
p;por_103530001_103017=2692792,00060,103017,2014-07,2016-05&amp;format=html_table&amp; 
date_format=YYYY-MM-DD&amp;rdb_compression=file&amp;submitted_form=parameter_ 
selection_list (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) (U.S. Geological Survey Gage No. 103530001).  
 129  Hearings, supra note 14, at 47 (statement of Mr. Mathews). 
 130  Id. 
 131  Id. 
 132  Id. at 47–48. 
 133  Id. at 48. 
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The case was remanded back to the state court and, as of the hearings on  
S. 18, “the action ha[d] not proceeded further.”134 
A number of commenters have speculated that this controversy directly 
led to the drafting of the McCarran Amendment.135 In the hearing on the bill, 
William H. Veeder, Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United 
Stateswho was tasked with testifying against S. 18 on behalf of the 
Department of Justicemade the comment that “Mr. Skeen’s client in 
Nevada and he and I talked about that client a long time, and Mr. Skeen 
admitted he was a little worried about the statute of limitations in that case, 
and that is why he drew up the bill and submitted it to Senator McCarran for 
introduction. He is the one who drew the bill.”136 The record also contains a 
letter from the Attorney General of the State of Nevada, W.T. Mathews, 
supporting S. 18 and providing information on the Quinn River situation.137 
Much of that letter was ultimately incorporated into the official Senate 
Report on S. 18.138 
2. The Colorado Adjudications: The United States Acquires State Law Water 
Rights Pursuant to the Reclamation Act but Refuses State Court 
Jurisdiction 
Starting in the late 1800s through 1969, Colorado’s practice was to 
adjudicate water rights on a rolling basis in seventy water districts.139 Some 
of these districts contained federal irrigation projects that had been 
developed pursuant to the Reclamation Act.140 Importantly, the Reclamation 
Act requires the United States to acquire water rights for irrigation projects 
pursuant to state law.141 One such adjudication took place in the early 1940s 
in Colorado Water District Number 36, which is the district that includes the 
Blue River,142 a primary source of Denver’s water supply.143 Initially, the 
United States entered the case and filed claims.144 However, it later withdrew 
	
 134  Id.  
 135  See, e.g., Dilworth & Kirgis, supra note 81, at 104. 
 136  Hearings, supra note 14, at 14 (statement of Mr. Veeder). Interestingly, the record is not 
clear on who the fabled Mr. Skeen is. In fact, for someone credited with being the author of the 
McCarran Amendment, Mr. Skeen is markedly absent from history. 
 137  Id. at 44–49 (statement of Mr. Mathews). 
 138  Dilworth & Kirgis, supra note 81, at 104. 
 139  Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado’s 1969 Adjudication and Administration Act: Settling In, 3 
U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 3, 5–9 (1999). 
 140  43 U.S.C. §§ 371–616yyyy (2012).  
 141  Id. § 383; see also California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 665 (1978) (“From the 
legislative history of the Reclamation Act of 1902 it is clear that . . . the Secretary would have to 
appropriate, purchase, or condemn necessary water rights in strict conformity with state law.”). 
 142  Hearings, supra note 14, at 26 (statement of Mr. Saunders). 
 143  Denver Water, Water Supply, http://www.denverwater.org/SupplyPlanning/WaterSupply/ 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2016).  
 144  Hearings, supra note 14, at 26 (describing the statement of Mr. Saunders). The record is 
not clear what claims were filed by the United States. However, the Bureau of Reclamation 
administers the Green Mountain Dam located on the Blue River for irrigation purposes, which is 
part of the Colorado-Big Thompson Reclamation Project. Bureau of Reclamation, Green 
Mountain Dam, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/index.php?id=174 (last visited Nov. 19, 2016). That 
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from the state court proceeding and initiated a new suit in federal court.145 
Glenn G. Saunders, the attorney representing the National Reclamation 
Association before the Senate hearing, also represented parties that were 
“on the other side” of the United States in the Water District Number 36 
adjudication.146 He argued that: 
  The United States came into this proceeding, and the whole thing could have 
been decided so far as district 36 was concerned in that proceeding, but at a 
later time the Department of Justice . . . withdrew from the proceeding. Later 
the United States started a new proceeding of its own in the United States 
district court . . . .147 
Mr. Saunders also highlighted the situation in Colorado Water District 
Number 51, which includes the Colorado-Big Thompson irrigation project.148 
Mr. Saunders stated that “the city and county of Denver has completely 
adjudicated water rights which run down south and over into Denver. Those 
water rights are completely adjudicated.”149 Subsequent to that decree, the 
United States filed suit in federal district court seeking to 
quiet the title of the United States for itself with reference to the city and 
county of Denver and others . . . and declare their respective rights subject and 
subordinate to the rights of the United States with respect to the Colorado-Big 
Thompson project, and forever enjoin them or any of them from encroaching 
upon or in any way interfering with those rights.150 
According to Mr. Saunders, “the prayer of [the United States’] 
complaint . . . would stop us from exercising adjudicated rights. . . . In effect 
this complaint requires us to relitigate in the United States district court 
every water right that we have adjudicated.”151 
3. Santa Margarita River, California: The United States Purchases State Law 
Water Rights and then Commences a Federal Court General Stream 
Adjudication 
By far, the controversy that received the most attention during 
consideration of S. 18 was the “socialistic growth”152 of federal authority over 
water rights that “nearly caused a revolution” in the Santa Margarita 
	
dam was constructed between 1938 and 1943. Id. It is likely that the claims filed by the United 
States were for water rights appurtenant to this project. 
 145  Hearings, supra note 14, at 26 (statement of Mr. Saunders).  
 146  Id. at 26 (statement of Mr. Veeder). 
 147  Id. at 26 (statement of Mr. Saunders). 
 148  Id. at 30–31. 
 149  Id. 
 150  Id. at 31. 
 151  Id. (emphasis added). 
 152  Letter from George F. Yackey, Gen. Manager, Fall Brook Pub. Util. Dist., to the Fall 
Brook Pub. Util. Dist. (June 15, 1951), in Hearings, supra note 14, at 77. 
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watershed in the early 1950s.153 According to the United States Geological 
Survey, the Santa Margarita River is a small intermittent stream with a 
drainage area of just 723 square miles above the gage located near Ysidora, 
California.154 The recorded average annual flow of the Santa Margarita River 
has been as high as 337 cfs in 1993, and as low as 3.13 cfs in 2013.155 The 
United States Geological Survey’s mean monthly statistics indicate that the 
flow in the stream gets as low as 2.8 cfs in August and 2.3 cfs in September.156 
The Santa Margarita River flows through Camp Pendleton, the “West 
Coast’s Premiere Expeditionary Training Base” of the United States Marine 
Corps.157 The United States purchased the Santa Margarita Rancho in the 
early 1940s for the purpose of developing a 135,000 acre base to house and 
train 28,000 marines.158 As part of that purchase, the United States acquired 
state law water rights that had been previously decreed by a California state 
court.159 Consistent with California law, the Rancho had been decreed a 
riparian right to 66.6% of the water in the stream while another major land 
owner was to receive the remaining 33.3%.160 However, according to the 
Saturday Evening Post, the two large landowners, “respecting tradition so 
hoary that it amounts to common law in the State . . . , recognized the water 
rights of all the other farmers along the way.”161 As of 1951, the Santa 
Margarita serviced approximately 16,000 water users in addition to the Camp 
Pendleton Marine Base.162 
Shortly after developing the base, the United States initiated a federal 
lawsuit where it “asked that its title be quieted to the water [of the Santa 
Margarita River]. It ask[ed] [for] 35,000 acre-feet, which . . . is probably in 
excess of the total water available in the stream.”163 This suit caused 
	
 153  GLEN G. SAUNDERS, REFLECTIONS ON SIXTY YEARS OF WATER LAW PRACTICE 31–32 (1989). 
 154  U.S. Geological Survey, USGS Surface-Water Annual Statistics for the Nation, 
http://waterdata.usgs.gov/nwis/annual/?referred_module=sw&amp;site_no=11046000&amp;por_
11046000_7845=2207600,00060,7845,1923,2016&amp;year_type=W&amp;format=html_table&am
p;date_format=YYYY-MM-DD&amp;rdb_compression=file&amp;submitted_form=parameter_ 
selection_list (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).  
 155  Id.  
 156  U.S. Geological Survey, USGS Surface-Water Monthly Statistics for the Nation, 
http://waterdata.usgs.gov/nwis/monthly?referred_module=sw&amp;site_no=11046000&amp;por
_11046000_7845=2207600,00060,7845,1923-03,2016-05&amp;format=html_table&amp;date_ 
format=YYYY-MM-DD&amp;rdb_compression=file&amp;submitted_form=parameter_selection 
_list (last visited Nov. 19, 2016). 
 157  W. Rivers Conservancy, Santa Margarita River, http://www.westernrivers.org/project 
atlas/santa-margarita-river/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2016); U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Base 
Camp Pendleton, http://www.pendleton.marines.mil/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2016). 
 158  Hearings, supra note 14, at 38 (statement of Rep. Samuel W. Yorty (D-Cal.)); Ed 
Ainsworth & Cameron Shipp, The Government’s Big Grab, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Jan. 5, 
1952, reprinted in 98 CONG. REC. 125 (1952). 
 159  Ainsworth & Shipp, supra note 158, at 126. 
 160  Id. 
 161  Id. 
 162  Stanley High, Washington Tyranny: Another Case Study, READER’S DIG., Dec. 1951, 
reprinted in 98 CONG. REC. 124 (1952).  
 163  Hearings, supra note 14, at 38 (statement of Rep. Yorty). 35,000 acre-feet in a year 
amounts to an average flow of 48 cubic feet per second, year-round. 
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considerable political backlash. Two articles were read into the 
Congressional Record that best exemplify public sentiment regarding this 
adjudication. The first, found in the Reader’s Digest, was entitled 
Washington Tyranny: Another Case Study.164 The second was a Saturday 
Evening Post article entitled The Government’s Big Grab.165 The Reader’s 
Digest article opened with the following story: 
  One day last April a United States marshal served a summons on Joe Hayes, 
an irrigation farmer living near Fallbrook, Calif. Hayes was informed that the 
Federal Government had laid claim to his privately owned water rights. The 
Government proposed to take over, without compensation, his entire water 
supply; and, to legalize this confiscation of his property, it had brought suit 
against him.166 
The story went on to point out: 
  In addition to the farmers of the area, there are other defendants: The 
Fallbrook Methodist Church, which uses water for drinking purposes for its 
Sunday school; the Odd Fellows Lodge, which uses water in its kitchen and for 
the cemetery which it owns; the board of trustees of the Fallbrook Union High 
School; Ruth Lillie, who owns neither land nor water rights but uses water in 
her home in a Federal housing project; Mary Hubbard, a 90-year-old widow 
whose sole supply of water is brought in buckets by her neighbors.167 
While, according to the Saturday Evening Post article, there were 
“helicopters bearing Government engineers and surveyors hovering over the 
land and frightening the farmers,”168 the base was using its water “not only 
for thirsty Marines but for the maintenance of an 18-hole golf course . . . 
[and] for watering the crops of a number of commercial flower growers to 
whom the Navy has leased Government land.”169 The article argued the base 
didn’t need the water from the Santa Margarita because “Pendleton’s supply 
of water, most of it pumped from wells, is at present ample.”170 Finally, it 
argued that when water does become scarce, the “long-time answer to Camp 
Pendleton’s water needs is not the Santa Margarita River at all but the 
Colorado [River].”171 
Given this, the Reader’s Digest article concluded that the suit was not 
about water rights but about setting “a revolutionary precedent.”172 Coming 
	
 164  High, supra note 162. 
 165  Ainsworth & Shipp, supra note 158. 
 166  High, supra note 162, at 164.  
 167  Id. 
 168  Ainsworth & Shipp, supra note 158, at 125. 
 169  High, supra note 162, at 124. 
 170  Id. 
 171  Id. 
 172  Id. The fear of the local people and politicians was based, in large part, upon some 
verbiage that was included in the complaint. Specifically, the complaint asked “[t]hat this court 
declare and determine that all of the rights of the United States of America are paramount and 
superior to those of the named defendants by virtue of the riparian character of the lands above 
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to a similar conclusion, the Saturday Evening Post argued that “the 
Fallbrook case is also a matter of national consequence: if the Federal 
Government can, by sovereign authority, take California water, then it might, 
by the same reasoning and authority, take anything anywhere.”173 Both 
articles quoted Pennsylvania Representative John Saylor as saying “if this 
attempt succeeds . . . then the whole historic pattern of the United States is 
changed and there is no telling when they may move into the coal fields of 
Pennsylvania or the oil fields of Oklahoma or the ore fields of Michigan.”174 
The article concluded that “there seem to be those in government who 
believe you can do whatever you want to do, providing you make it legal.”175 
It cannot be overstated the amount of political pressure that was 
brought to bear upon the United States Department of Justice in reaction to 
its decision to initiate the Santa Margarita Adjudication. The matter was 
debated on the floor of Congress,176 and it was a major issue in the hearings 
on the nomination of A. Devitt VanechMr. Veeder’s supervisorto be 
Deputy Attorney General of the United States.177 Most importantly, it was an 
issue that arose several times in the hearings on S. 18. Representative 
Samuel W. Yorty (D-Cal.) made a point of appearing in support of S. 18: 
  I would very much like to see S. 18 enacted into law. I do not know, 
particularly where the Government is acting . . . [in] areas where only private 
rights were previously involved, the fact that the Government comes in and 
	
mentioned and the ownership of them by the United States.” Hearings, supra note 14, at 40 
(statement of Rep. Yorty) (emphasis added). The term “paramount” was very troubling to 
California residents because that term had also been used by the United States Supreme Court 
in United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), in determining the United States has 
“paramount rights” to three-mile wide strip of submerged lands off the California Coast. Id. at 
38–39. Californians, including the local United States Representative Samuel W. Yorty, were 
concerned that, fresh off its win in the United States Supreme Court, the United States was 
attempting to expand the Court’s decision to water rights and other natural resources that had 
traditionally remained under state control. Hearings, supra note 14, at 42 (statement of Rep. 
Yorty). However, as clarified by Mr. Veeder: 
when you sue a man, in a suit of this kind, you assert that your rights are superior and 
predominant, and that is really what suggests this issue.  
  You will observe that in California decisions―and that is the source of the word 
“paramount,” as we use it―they refer to a riparian right as a “paramount” or a 
“predominant” right 
. . . .  
  In other words, there is no basis contended that the term “paramount” has anything 
whatever to do with sovereignty. 
Id. at 58 (statement of Mr. Veeder). As, Mr. Veeder clarified, the United States used the word 
“paramount” “as a word of art in water law, and not as having anything to do with sovereignty, 
we assert a paramount right because we are the owners of a riparian right.” Id. at 59. 
 173  Ainsworth & Shipp, supra note 158, at 125. 
 174  Id.; High, supra note 162, at 125. 
 175  High, supra note 162, at 125. 
 176  E.g., 97 CONG. REC. 12,947–48 (1951); 98 CONG. REC. 120–29 (1952). 
 177  Hearings, supra note 14, at 69–70 (statements of Sen. William F. Knowland (R-Cal.) and 
Sen. Richard M. Nixon (R-Cal.)). 
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precludes people from getting into court to establish what the Government 
rights are . . . it seems to me that where they are acting in lieu of former private 
owners, they should take the same disabilities as well as take the benefits.178 
These three controversies made up the backdrop leading up to the 
hearings on the McCarran Amendment. Significantly, all of these cases 
involved federal ownership of state law rights rather than the reserved water 
rights of an Indian Tribe. The Quinn River case involved state law rights 
subsequently purchased by the United States; the cases in Colorado involved 
water rights acquired pursuant to state law as required by the Reclamation 
Act; and, like at the Quinn River, the Santa Margarita adjudication was for 
state water rights purchased by the United States. In these cases, the United 
States used its sovereign immunity to 1) preclude state court administration 
of a previously adjudicated decree; 2) refuse state court jurisdication to 
adjudicate water rights the United States had acquired pursuant to state law; 
and 3) force either the adjudication or readjudication of previously 
adjudicated state law rights in federal court. The United States’ refusal to 
join state court adjudication and administration proceedings forced state 
courts onto the horns of a dilemma. These courts could either determine the 
government was a necessary party as it did in the Quinn River watershed, 
thereby precluding the continuation of the action, or move on without the 
United States as it did in Colorado and risk that the federal government 
would later argue that res judicata did not apply and force a readjudication 
of rights already adjudicated by the state court. Each case acted to 
effectively preclude the states’ courts from enforcing state water laws 
“[w]herever . . . the United States appears in a watershed,”179 causing 
considerable concern that federal ownership of state water rights was 
threatening “the years of building the water laws of the Western States.”180 It 
was these types of controversies that were on the minds of the Senators as 
they developed, debated, and ultimately passed the McCarran Amendment. 
B. The Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee and Debate on the Floor of 
the Senate 
Senators McCarran of Nevada and Watkins of Utah were cosponsors of 
S. 18.181 As cosponsors, these Senators were instrumental in the development 
and passage of the McCarran Amendment. The Supreme Court has said that, 
when analyzing the legislative history of a statute, “[i]t is the sponsors that 
we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt.”182 As such, 
Senators McCarran’s and Watkins’s understanding of the bill is particularly 
probative of the purpose and intent behind the McCarran Amendment. 
Senator Watkins’s statements come from three days of hearings on the bill in 
	
 178  Id. at 43–44 (statement of Rep. Yorty). 
 179  Hearings, supra note 14, at 22 (statement of Mr. Saunders). 
 180  S. REP. NO. 82-755, at 5 (1951). 
 181  97 CONG. REC. 10,682 (1951). 
 182  Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394–95 (1951). 
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the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United 
States.183 Senator McCarran’s statements came on the floor of the Senate 
during debate of the bill.184 
1. The Hearings on the McCarran Amendment Chaired by Senator Arthur V. 
Watkins 
The members of the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary 
of the United States Senate included Senator McCarran, Senator Watkins, 
and Senator Warren G. Magnuson (D-Wash.).185 Senator Watkins was made 
cosponsor of the McCarran Amendment by unanimous consent186 and was 
overwhelmingly the person that lead the hearings and drove the questioning 
of witnesses during the hearings on the bill.187 
Senator Watkins understood state water law. He was a lawyer in his 
home state of Utah and served as the director of the Provo River Water 
Users Association.188 Part of his duties as director included the organization 
of metropolitan water districts along the Wasatch front.189 He also worked to 
develop the Deer Creek Reservoir Project, a component part of the Provo 
River Reclamation Project.190 
More importantly, Senator Watkins understood how to abolish Indian 
treaty rights. As the Chairman of the Indian Subcommittee of the Interior 
Committee, he was the primary architect of the federal government’s 
termination policy of the 1950s.191 Undoubtedly, as Chairman of the Indian 
Subcommittee, Senator Watkins understood that Congress is presumed to be 
“fully aware of the means by which termination [of traditional Indian 
immunities] could be effected.”192 Further, he would have understood that 
congressional abrogation of Indian property rights will not be inferred but 
must instead be “plain and unambiguous” or “clear and plain.”193 This 
	
 183  See infra Part V.B.1. 
 184  See infra Part V.B.2. 
 185  Hearings, supra note 14. 
 186  97 CONG. REC. 10,682 (1951). 
 187  Hearings, supra note 14. 
 188  R. WARREN METCALF, TERMINATION’S LEGACY: THE DISCARDED INDIANS OF UTAH 26 (2002). 
 189  Id. 
 190  Id. 
 191  VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS 62–69 (1988) (detailing Senator Watkins’s 
involvement with the federal government’s termination policy). 
 192  Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 393 (1976) (quoting Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 
504 (1973)). 
 193  United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 346, 353 (1941). This principle has 
been reaffirmed repeatedly. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 
U.S. 172, 202 (1999) (“Congress may abrogate Indian treaty rights, but it must clearly express its 
intent to do so.”); United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739–40 (1986) (“What is essential is clear 
evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on one 
hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the 
treaty.”); Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 
690 (1979) (“Absent explicit statutory language, we have been extremely reluctant to find 
congressional abrogation of treaty rights . . . .”); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 
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requires the abrogation “be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from 
the surrounding circumstances and legislative history.”194 Given this, it is fair 
to expect at least “some mention” of Indian Tribes in the hearings on S. 18 if 
Senator Watkins intended for “such a sweeping change in the status of tribal 
government and reservation Indians” to take place.195 
Just the opposite, the little discussion that did occur suggests the 
Senator intended the McCarran Amendment to have no impact on Indian 
water rights. The sole discussion regarding Indian tribes came in a dialogue 
regarding the Boulder Canyon Project Act196 and Arizona’s attempts to have 
the United States Supreme Court apportion the water of the Colorado 
River.197 Mr. Veeder argued that “[the Boulder Canyon Act] specifically 
provides that the largest user on the Colorado, the largest claimant on the 
Colorado River, is exempt from it the Indian service, the Indian rights.”198 
Earlier in the same proceeding Mr. Veeder highlighted “On Indian rights 
alone, I think there are something like . . . 1,000,000 acre-feet that they are 
claiming for Indian rights down there. . . . I hope the proponents of this 
legislation understand that this in our estimation has sufficient breadth to 
authorize that litigation.”199 Senator Watkins dismissed this, stating “[a]ll 
right. They have taken care of whatever the Indians have, and they act in a 
trust capacity . . . for the Indians.”200 Mr. Veeder responded, “[b]ut the fact 
remains that there is a million acre-feet of water the United States owns in 
there. It doesn’t matter how it owns it.”201 In response, Senator Watkins 
stated, “[y]es, it does. It makes quite a difference how it owns it. That is the 
point. It owns it as trustee. The beneficiaries are the Indians and they have 
prior right to the United States.”202 
This comment is the key to the proper construction of the McCarran 
Amendment. It exposes the confluence of the two themes that were 
ubiquitous throughout the hearings. First, it clarifies that the Senator wanted 
the applicability of the waiver to depend upon whether the United States 
was claiming to have a “privilege of immunity that the original owner 
wouldn’t have.”203 
Second, it reveals that the Senator viewed the applicability of the bill to 
be limited to situations where the United States acts “in a proprietary 
position.”204 He and other proponents of the bill repeatedly returned to the 
theme that when the United States ceases to act as a sovereign and steps 
	
391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968) (“[T]he intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly 
imputed to the Congress.”). 
 194  Bryan, 426 U.S. at 393 (quoting Mattz, 412 U.S. at 504–05). 
 195  Id. at 373.  
 196  43 U.S.C. §§ 617–617v (2012). 
 197  Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 550–51 (1962). 
 198  Hearings, supra note 14, at 13 (statement of Mr. Veeder). 
 199  Id. at 6. 
 200  Id. at 13 (statement of Sen. Watkins). 
 201  Id. (statement of Mr. Veeder). 
 202  Id. (statement of Sen. Watkins). 
 203  Id. at 8. 
 204  Id. at 9. 
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into the shoes of a private appropriator by acquiring state law water rights, it 
should take the “disabilities as well as take the benefits” and acquire no 
better rights than any other appropriator.205 
An overwhelming majority of Senator Watkins’s comments reveal that 
the “policy underlying the McCarran Amendment”206 was to address the 
issues that were occurring in places like the Quinn River in Nevada, the 
Santa Margarita in California, and the adjudications in Colorado. In each of 
these basins, the United Statesacting in a proprietary mannerhad 
acquired state law rights, but was subsequently refusing the jurisdiction of 
state courts to enforce those rights. Testifying on the Santa Margarita 
controversy, Representative Yorty pointed out that “any rights the 
Government has were acquired when they purchased the Santa Margarita 
Rancho along about 1940.”207 His comments cut to the core of the purpose of 
S. 18: 
[W]hen [the United States] bought the Rancho Santa Margarita . . . whatever 
rights were pertinent to that ranch were based upon the private ownership, and 
the rights acquired by the private owners. 
. . . . 
. . . [W]hy should the purchase of it by the United States . . . change the water 
rights to the extent of making it paramount to everybody else on the stream?208 
Senator Watkins applied this same logic to scenarios similar to the 
Colorado experience where the United States had acquired water rights 
directly from the state rather than by purchase or exchange. Senator 
Watkins was frustrated that: 
	
 205  Id. at 44 (statement of Rep. Yorty); see also id. at 21 (statement of Mr. Saunders) 
(“[T]here is . . . a universal intent that the United States should have no special advantage or 
preference when it acted in its proprietary capacity as an appropriator in the arid West, the 
cloak of sovereign immunity . . . has prevented the fulfillment of this ideal.”); id. at 49 
(statement of Mr. Mathews) (“There can be no good reason why the water rights acquired by 
the United States for the proprietary and economic use of its departments should acquire any 
different status from water rights acquired by individuals . . . .”); id. at 49 (statement of Merl B. 
Peek, Assistant Secretary-Manager, Nat’l Reclamation Ass’n) (“The water users of the West are 
aware that the special advantages or preferences accorded the United States in its acts of a 
proprietary nature with respect to the appropriation of water . . . .”). One of the few places that 
indicate a contrary view was a single comment where Senator Watkins asked Mr. Veeder: 
“Suppose we amended the bill just to put the United States in the position that it waives its 
rights in cases where it was in a proprietary situation or trust relationship [pursuant to the 
Reclamation Act].” Id. at 9 (statement of Sen. Watkins). However, based upon the entire body of 
the legislative history, it seems the Senator ultimately concluded that an amendment was not 
necessary because he did not view S. 18 to amount to a general waiver of sovereign immunity. 
See id. at 14. 
 206  San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 570 (1983) (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. 800, 
820 (1976)). 
 207  Hearings, supra note 14, at 38 (statement of Rep. Yorty). 
 208  Id. at 41. 
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  The State has permitted [the United States] to file, in accordance with State 
law, applications to put this water to a beneficial use, and you are proceeding 
year after year and paying the fees. . . . You go as far as you can, get all the 
benefits out of the State law, and then when we get to this other point you can’t 
be brought in.209 
Senator Watkins went on to point out, “in all States where you have the 
doctrine of appropriation, you have State engineers and you file 
applications, the Federal Government has followed through the Bureau of 
Reclamation a uniform practice of filing the application just like any other 
applicant.”210 Ultimately, this led to the rhetorical question “why shouldn’t 
the United States in those circumstances in that type of case be perfectly 
willing to go into the State court just as it has gone in before the State 
engineer and permit an adjudication?”211 
A separate but related issue was the interrelationship between the 
proposed McCarran Amendment and the Reclamation Act. The record 
repeatedly refers to the term “trustee,” which is also a term of art when 
referring to the relationship between the United States and Indian Tribes. 
However, in this case, it seems that, as pointed out by Senator Watkins, the 
term is referring to the relationship between the United States and 
individuals benefitting from the Reclamation Act: 
  It acts as the trustee, for instance, on the Provo River. It makes filings with 
the State engineer of Utah and buys water rights for the use of the Provo River 
project . . . . That is not actually in a sovereign sense. It is doing that in the 
capacity of trustee. If the beneficiary there were the actual owner, if you 
transferred them over, the beneficiary could be taken in and made a party, but 
the United States, standing in trust for these beneficiaries, can’t be taken in.212 
Senator Watkins highlights that the critical inquiry is 1) whether the 
United States is acting in a proprietary or sovereign capacity, and 2) whether 
the underlying beneficiary would have sovereign immunity in their own 
right.213 
The National Reclamation Association took the same view. Speaking on 
their behalf, Glenn Saunders argued: 
[T]here is a large body of law demonstrating a universal intent that the United 
States should have no special advantage or preference when it acted in its 
proprietary capacity as an appropriator . . . the cloak of sovereign immunity . . . 
has prevented the fulfillment of this ideal. S. 18 is a step in the direction of 
completing the requirement that the United States shall act as any other 
	
 209  Id. at 10 (statement of Sen. Watkins). 
 210  Id. at 11. 
 211  Id. (emphasis added). Senator Watkins returned to this questions several times 
throughout the hearings, earlier asking “[i]f you are going in the State and file applications and 
take advantage of State laws and whatever benefits come from it, then why shouldn’t you go 
into State courts for adjudication?” Id. at 7. 
 212  Id. at 9. 
 213  Id. 
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appropriator . . . with respect to the limitations imposed by the appropriation 
system of water law which prevails in the arid West.214 
The National Reclamation Association was a primary proponent of the 
McCarran Amendment because its members wanted “legislation be urged to 
strengthen the basic concept of section 8 [of the Reclamation Act] to require 
that the administration and distribution of such appropriated waters shall at 
all times be under the control, direction, and supervision of the established 
water officials and courts of the State.”215 Accordingly, the National 
Reclamation Association urged Congress to, through a resolution, to pass a 
law: 
  That . . . the Congress of the United States [give consent that] the United 
States may sue or be sued in all suits necessary for the protection of the 
interests of the United States in water appropriation matters in the State courts 
of the State where such waters are appropriated and/or beneficially used . . . .216 
Importantly, section 8, and the Reclamation Act as a whole, has nothing 
to do with reserved water rights. Further, the terms “appropriation” and 
“beneficially used,” both terms of art for the state law based prior 
appropriation doctrine, indicates the National Reclamation Association was 
referring to only water rights acquired under state law. It further clarified 
that its concern was that the United States had been purchasing state law 
rights and then refusing to go into state court to defend them. From its point 
of view: 
[W]herever the United States becomes the proprietor of a water right in the 
western United States, all of the supposedly settled water rights are subject to 
review and reexamination in a court of the United States even though the 
validity of all the water rights in the area may have been theretofore fully 
determined by action of a State court. Such an upheaval may occur at any time 
that the United States appears in a watershed, either as an appropriator or as a 
purchaser of a water right, under the present state of the law.217 
Speaking on behalf of the National Reclamation Association, Glenn 
Saunders argued that “[t]he only possible way that we can hold the United 
States to the observance of our [state] laws is to have them amenable to our 
courts.”218 
Ultimately, Mr. Saunders argued that “[the] fundamental question here, 
the one thing we have been discussing, is the question of whether the United 
States, when it becomes an appropriator of water, should not follow through 
	
 214  Id. at 21 (statement of Mr. Saunders) (emphasis added). 
 215  Id. (emphasis added); 43 U.S.C. § 383 (2012). By its very terms, reserved rights are not 
considered. 
 216  Hearings, supra note 14, at 21. 
 217  Id. at 22. 
 218  Id. at 29 (emphasis added). Recall that reserved rights are determined pursuant to federal 
rather than state law. See supra Part II. 
8_TOJCI.HEDDEN-NICELY (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/2017  1:18 PM 
2016] INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS 877 
all the way, just like any other private appropriator.”219 He went on to 
highlight that “[S.] 18 is slanted at . . . this fundamental proposition that 
when the United States becomes an appropriator of water in a Western State 
it shall take on exactly the same status and burden as any private 
appropriator.”220 He concluded that “we really believe is that the Federal 
Government, when it becomes an appropriator or an owner of water on any 
stream, should have to submit itself to exactly the same procedures as a 
private appropriator in the matter of appropriation.”221 
To drive this point home, the Association submitted a summary of 
arguments: 
(1) Water rights are rights of beneficial use and are vested property rights. 
(2) Under Federal Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1877, the United States irrevocably 
and unconditionally surrendered its rights to the States to control the use of 
waters of the streams in the West. 
(3) The failure of the United States to submit to the jurisdiction of State 
courts . . . for the adjudication of appropriative rights . . . leaves such State 
administration over such streams incomplete; and, in fact, jeopardizes such 
State administration.222 
For his part, Senator Watkins supported the Association’s point of view: 
There are some phases of Government activity in relation to water rights that 
ought to be protected so that the United States would not be subject to waiver, 
forfeiture, abandonment and what not. Maybe that ought to be taken care of, 
but I have a strong feeling that we ought to have litigation in the direction that 
has been proposed by the [N]ational [Reclamation] [A]ssociation.223 
Senator Watkins ultimately concluded that S. 18 didn’t constitute a general 
waiver but instead was proposed to address a very specific and narrow 
situation: 
[I]f the United States is going to come in there and take advantage of the laws 
and acquire water rights in trust for private individuals, private 
corporations . . . the people of Utah are vitally interested in seeing that the 
United States goes the full distance, and not only claims all the assets that go 
along but takes a few of the liabilities and subjects itself to the courts there and 
has those rights determined. You are not being hurt in any other capacity. 
	
 219  Hearings, supra note 14, at 32. 
 220  Id. at 25. 
 221  Id. at 33. 
 222  Id. at 50 (statement of Mr. Peek). Importantly, the Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1877 only apply 
to “sources of water supply upon the public lands.” Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, § 1, 19 Stat. 
377, 377 (emphasis added) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 321 (2012)). They are “not 
applicable to . . . reserved land and waters.” Fed. Power Comm’n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 
(1955). 
 223  Hearings, supra note 14, at 35 (statement of Sen. Watkins).  
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When you get into the field of becoming trustee for private individuals, then 
you ought to be willing to submit to the same jurisdiction the individuals would 
be if they owned the property and had the legal title as well as the equitable 
title.224 
This history indicates that the proponents of S. 18, particularly Senator 
Watkins, sought to fix a problem that did not apply to the water rights of 
Indian tribes. The confluence of the two primary themes of the hearings that 
when the United States acts in a proprietary capacity and steps into the 
shoes of a private appropriator it should not be able to claim a “privilege of 
immunity that the original owner wouldn’t have”225 are themes only 
applicable to water rights acquired pursuant to state law. When the United 
States reserves water rights on behalf of Indian tribes it is doing so in its 
sovereign capacity.226 Furthermore, Indian tribes, unlike private 
appropriators, enjoy sovereign immunity in their own right.227 As such, when 
the inquiry is refocused on the reserved rights held in trust for the tribes the 
United States would not “be given a privilege of immunity the original owner 
wouldn’t have.”228 Therefore, “[w]hen attention is shifted to those sources of 
water rights that are not available to the private users [e.g. reserved 
rights] . . . the applicability of the statute becomes extremely doubtful.”229 
2. Senator Pat McCarran’s Statements on the Floor of the Senate 
Senator McCarran was the original sponsor of the McCarran 
Amendment.230 However, he is strikingly silent in the legislative history on 
the bill. He did not participate in the subcommittee hearings.231 In fact, his 
only comments come in a letter to fellow Senator Warren G. Magnuson of 
Washington State232 and a brief debate on the floor of the Senate. However, 
his comments on the floor of the Senate give a good outline regarding his 
view of the scope of the McCarran Amendment: 
	
 224  Id. at 14–15 (emphasis added). 
 225  Id. at 8 (statement of Sen. Watkins).  
 226  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 19.03[4]; see also DE VATTEL, supra note 31 at 160. 
 227  See cases cited supra note 57. 
 228  Hearings, supra note 14, at 8 (statement of Sen. Watkins). 
 229  Dilworth & Kirgis, supra note 81, at 110. 
 230  97 CONG. REC. 10,682 (1951). 
 231  Hearings, supra note 14. 
 232  Letter from Senator Pat McCarran to Senator Warren G. Magnuson (Aug. 25, 1951), in S. 
REP. NO. 82-755, at 9–10 (1951). Senator Magnuson was concerned the McCarran Amendment 
could authorize “an individual or group, having water rights on [a] stream, bringing suit to 
adjudicate their respective rights―thereby preventing the Bureau of Reclamation from going 
ahead with the Hells Canyon Project while litigation is in process or pending.” Letter from 
Senator Warren G. Magnuson to Senator Pat McCarran (Aug. 24, 1951), in S. REP. NO. 82-755, at 
9. In response, Senator McCarran made clear that “S. 18 is not intended to be used for the 
purpose of obstructing the project of which you speak or any similar project and it is not 
intended to be used for any other purpose than to allow the United States to be joined in a suit 
where it is necessary to adjudicate all of the rights of various owners on a given stream.” Letter 
from Senator Pat McCarran to Senator Warren G. Magnuson, supra note 232, at 9–10. 
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Mr. President, the purpose of the proposed legislation is to permit the United 
States of America to be joined as a defendant in any suit for the adjudication of 
rights to the use of water from any water source, or for the administration of 
such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner, or is in the 
process of acquiring ownership of rights by appropriation under State law, and 
where there is a showing that the United States is a necessary party to such 
adjudication.233 
Senator McCarran also laid out the policy issue the McCarran 
Amendment intended to address: 
The State of New Mexico, the State of Nevada, the State of Idaho, the State of 
California—in fact, all the western arid and semi-arid States—are interested in 
the bill, because the Government of the United States, during the past 15 or 18 
years, has acquired on the various natural streams of the West, holdings in real 
estate which was formerly taken up by private citizens and in connection with 
which they, as private citizens, diverted water from the natural streams and 
applied it to the land.234 
From his view, this had created a jurisdictional vacuum in the West 
whereby the United States was stepping into the shoes of private 
appropriators by acquiring state law water rights but refusing be joined to 
state court proceedings for the determination and/or administration of those 
rights. 
  The necessity that all owners or claimants of water rights on a given stream 
be joined in a suit for the adjudication of water rights is conceded. . . . 
  Particularly in view of the fact that the United States has acquired its water 
rights from former owners who were subject to such suits, the committee is of 
the opinion that to allow the United States in its own right or as trustee to have 
a better right than the former owner is not fair and just to the other water users 
on the stream.235 
Importantly, Indian tribes came up during debate on the McCarran 
Amendment on the floor of the Senate. However, they did not come up in the 
context of whether their water rights were within the scope of the 
Congressional waiver of sovereign immunity. Instead, Senator Dennis 
Chávez (D-N.M.) was asking about a portion of the bill that would later be 
removed that required the Department of the Interior to inventory all water 
rights claimed by the United States.236 Senator Chávez wanted to know 
whether “Indian rights will also be integrated [into that inventory]?”237 
Senator McCarran replied with an unequivocal “No. All that the bill provides 
	
 233  97 CONG. REC. 12,947 (1951) (statement of Sen. McCarran). 
 234  Id. at 12,948. 
 235  Id. 
 236  Id. (statement of Sen. Dennis Chávez). 
 237  Id. 
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is that the Interior Department shall be a repository of the rights that have 
been acquired and are held by the United States.”238 However, Senator 
Chavez went on to ask “[d]oes the Government claim those rights as the 
Government, or could it act as trustee, let us say, for a tribe of Indians?”239 
Senator McCarran replied that “[i]t could act as a trustee, I suppose. But, Mr. 
President, there is a deeper and more far-reaching purpose [to the 
inventory].”240 
Unfortunately, the debate ended at this point without Senator McCarran 
explaining his view on this important point. Although it does not directly 
address the question of sovereign immunity, it does expose the Senator’s 
state of mind vis-à-vis the interrelationship between the bill and Indian 
tribes. It clearly shows that Senator McCarran had not considered and did 
not believe the bill would include tribal water rights. As the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly found, “[t]he silence of the sponsors of amendments is 
pregnant with significance.”241 
Additionally, his statement regarding the United States “act[ing] as a 
trustee” should be viewed through the lens of Nevada’s experience during 
the Quinn River Adjudication.242 In that case, the Bureau of Indian Affairs had 
purchased land for the benefit of the Fort McDermitt Northern Paiute and 
Western Shoshone Tribes.243 Along with that land, the Bureau acquired a 
number of state-issued water rights.244 The Bureau refused to be joined to a 
state court adjudication to have those state-issued rights administered. In 
this unique instance, the government was acting as trustee for the Tribes but 
the water rights in question were not reserved rights. Instead, the Bureau 
had acquired state rights that would have otherwise been subject to state 
court jurisdiction.245 Although it cannot be definitively said that this is the 
scenario Senator McCarran had in mind when making his comments on the 
floor of the Senate, it is consistent with the general policy he espoused that 
where “the United States has acquired its water rights from former owners 
who were subject to such suits” it was not “fair and just” to other water 
users “to allow the United States in its own right or as trustee to have a 
better right than the former owner.”246 
	
 238  Id. (statement of Sen. McCarran) (emphasis added). 
 239  Id. (statement of Sen. Dennis Chávez). 
 240  Id. (statement of Sen. McCarran). 
 241  Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 706, 377 
U.S. 58, 66 (1964). 
 242  97 CONG. REC. 12,948 (1951) (statement of Sen. McCarran); see also supra Part V.A.1 
(discussing the Quinn River Adjudication). 
 243  Act of Jan. 17, 1936, ch. 7, 49 Stat. 1094. 
 244  Hearings, supra note 14, at 47 (statement of Mr. Mathews). 
 245  Id. at 47–48. 
 246  97 CONG. REC. 12,948 (1951) (statement of Sen. McCarran). 
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C. The Senate Report 
The official Senate Report on the McCarran Amendment begins with a 
somewhat unhelpful statement regarding the official purpose of the 
McCarran Amendment: 
  The purpose of the proposed legislation, as amended, is to permit the joinder 
of the United States as a party defendant in any suit for the adjudication of 
rights to the use of water of a river system or other source or for the 
administration of such rights where it appears that the United States is the 
owner or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under 
State law, by purchase, exchange, or otherwise and that the United States is a 
necessary party to such suit.247 
The statement of purpose is no more than a restatement of the language 
of the McCarran Amendment itself. As such, little information can be 
gleaned as to Congress’s intent. However, the Report goes on to explain that 
“in order to understand the background of this legislation a résumé of some 
of the history and decisions relating to the law of water rights would be of 
help.”248 Importantly, the history and decisions the Report refers to address 
only the congressional deference to state law water rights on the public 
domain: 
In 1877 the Congress, in the Desert Land Act of 1877, severed the water from 
the land, and the effect of such statute was thereafter that the land should be 
patented by the United States separate and apart from the water and that all 
nonnavigable water should be reserved for the use of the public under the laws 
of the States and Territories named in the act.249 
The Report goes on to clarify “Congress was most careful not to upset, 
in any way, the irrigation and water laws of the Western States.”250 “It is 
therefore settled that in the arid Western States the law of appropriation is 
	
 247  S. REP. NO. 82-755, at 2 (1951). 
 248  Id. 
 249  Id. at 3 (internal citations omitted). The only place where Indians are specifically 
mentioned in the Senate Report comes on page four, wherein the drafters noted that  
the [Supreme] Court said in a marginal note on page 164 of the opinion: 
  In this connection it is not without significance that Congress since the passage of the 
Desert Land Act, has repeatedly recognized the supremacy of State law in respect to the 
acquisition of water for the reclamation of public lands of the United States and lands of 
its Indian wards. 
Id. at 4 (quoting Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 164 (1935)). 
However, the language of the statement clearly refers to water rights “acquire[d]” rather than 
“reserved.” Further, it specifically limits the statement to water acquired under the reclamation 
laws, which expressly require the United States to acquire water rights under state law. 
Reclamation Act, 43 U.S.C. § 383 (2012). 
 250  S. REP. NO. 82-755, at 3 (1951). 
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the law governing the right to acquire, use, administer, and protect the 
public waters as provided in each such State.”251 
According to the Senate Report, a primary basis for the McCarran 
Amendment is the Desert Land Act and Congress’s deference to state water 
law.252 However, Congress knew at the time the Report was published that 
the Desert Land Act expressly concerned only “sources of water supply 
upon the public lands.”253 Further, Congress understood the “familiar 
principle of public land law that statutes providing generally for disposal of 
the public domain are inapplicable to lands which are not unqualifiedly 
subject to sale and disposition because they have been appropriated to some 
other purpose.”254 Simply put, Congress understood that its deference to 
state water law did not apply to federal reservations of water.255 
Further, the Senate Report expressly limited its scope to “acquired” 
water rights.256 This language clarifies that the reach of the McCarran 
Amendment was intended to be limited to state law water rights because, 
even at the time of the McCarran Amendment’s consideration in Congress, it 
was well settled that the United States does not typically acquire water 
rights on behalf of Indian Tribes. Rather, Indian Tribes impliedly reserve 
their rights pursuant to the operative documents that created each Indian 
reservation.257 
It is worth remembering that “the report of the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary on [S. 18] is based largely upon” a statement to the Senate 
drafted by W.T. Mathews, Attorney General for the State of Nevada.258 As 
such, the Senate Report, and indeed, the intent of the Congress in passing 
the McCarran Amendment, should be considered from the perspective of the 
experience of western states in places like the Quinn River in Nevada. 
Through this lens, the portion of the Senate Report quoted by the Supreme 
Court in Colorado River comes into clearer view. That portion of the Senate 
Report, which is copied directly out of Mr. Mathew’s statement, reads: “[i]n 
the administration and the adjudication of water rights under State laws . . . 
all water users on a stream, in practically every case, are interested and 
necessary parties to any court proceedings.”259 The actual text of Mr. 
Mathew’s statement clarifies that the Quinn River controversy was “[a] most 
concrete example” of the type of problem the McCarran Amendment was 
	
 251  Id. at 4. 
 252  Id. 
 253  Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, § 1, 19 Stat. 377, 377 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. 
§ 321 (2012)). 
 254  United States v. O’Donnell, 303 U.S. 501, 510 (1938); see also Scott v. Carew, 196 U.S. 100, 
109 (1905); Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Roberts, 152 U.S. 114, 119 (1894); Wilcox v. Jackson ex 
dem. McConnel, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 499 (1839). 
 255  United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899). 
 256  S. REP. NO. 82-755, at 2, 4–6 (1951). 
 257  See supra Part II. 
 258  Dilworth & Kirgis, supra note 81, at 104. 
 259  Compare S. REP. NO. 82-755, at 4–5 (1951) (emphasis added), with Hearings, supra note 
14, at 47 (statement of Mr. Mathews). 
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intended to resolve.260 That controversy arose after the United States 
purchased previously decreed state law water rights but refused to enter 
state court for the administration of those rights.261 Because the United 
States was “a most necessary party . . . due to the interlocking nature of the 
adjudicated rights,” the United States’ refusal to join the administration 
proceedings precluded the state court’s ability to enforce the decree and, as 
of the date of Mr. Mathews’ statement, the “the action ha[d] not proceeded 
further.”262 
It would seem that the McCarran Amendment was designed to address 
the inequity caused by the federal claim of immunity in situations like the 
Quinn River controversy. The problem was that “[t]he United States has 
acquired many lands and water rights in States that have the doctrine of 
prior appropriation,” and: 
It is apparent that if any water user claiming to hold such right by reason of 
ownership thereof by the United States or any of its departments is permitted 
to claim immunity from suit in, or orders of, a State court, such claims could 
materially interfere with the lawful and equitable use of water for beneficial 
use by the other water users who are amenable to and bound by the decrees 
and orders of the State courts.263 
The Report went on to highlight that: 
If a water user [the United States,] possessing a decreed water right is immune 
from suits and proceedings in the courts for enforcement of valid decrees, then 
the years of building the water laws of the Western States in the earnest 
endeavor of their proponents to effect honest, fair and equitable division of the 
public waters will be seriously jeopardized.264 
Ultimately, the Senate concluded that “[w]hen these lands and water 
rights were acquired from the individuals the Government obtained no 
better rights than had the persons from whom the rights were obtained.”265 
This suggests that the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity was 
intended to be limited to those situations where the United States was 
stepping into the shoes of private appropriators, because in those instances 
“there is no valid reason why the United States should not be required to join 
in a proceeding when it is a necessary party and to be required to abide by 
the decisions of the Court in the same manner as if it were a private 
individual.”266 
The Report concluded that “Congress has not removed the bar of 
immunity even in its own courts in suits wherein water rights acquired under 
	
 260  Hearings, supra note 14, at 47 (statement of Mr. Mathews). 
 261  See supra Part V.A.1. 
 262  Hearings, supra note 14, at 47–48 (statement of Mr. Mathews). 
 263  S. REP. NO. 82-755, at 5 (1951). 
 264  Id. 
 265  Id. at 5–6 (emphasis added). 
 266  Id. at 6. 
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State law are drawn in question. The bill (S. 18) was introduced for the very 
purpose of correcting this situation and the evils growing out of such 
immunity.”267 
D. The Interpretation of the Departments of Justice and the Interior 
The Supreme Court in Colorado River stated the “legislative history 
demonstrates that . . . [i]t was unmistakably the understanding of 
proponents and opponents of the legislation that it comprehended water 
rights reserved for Indians.”268 However, the Court’s analysis of the legislative 
history was limited to a single statement from the Senate report and that: 
In the Senate hearings on the Amendment, participants for the Department of 
Justice and the Department of the Interior made clear that the proposal would 
include water rights reserved on behalf of Indians. In addition, the Senate 
report on the amendment took note of a recommendation in a Department of 
the Interior report that no consent to suit be given as to Indian rights and 
rejected the recommendation.269 
Far from both the “proponents and opponents,” the only entity that 
actually discussed the impact the McCarran Amendment may have on Indian 
water rights in any detail was the executive branch, which very clearly 
sought the defeat of the bill. The letter cited by the Supreme Court from 
Mastin G. White, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Interior,270 is one of the 
only places in the legislative history where Indian reserved water rights were 
specifically mentioned: 
  The interests of the United States in the use of the waters of its river systems 
are so many and so varied . . . It is enough, I hope, for present purposes to 
exemplify these interests by pointing to those which it has under the 
commerce clauses of the Constitution; those which exist by virtue of the 
creation of Indian reservations under the doctrine of United States v. Winters 
or by virtue of the creation of, for instance, a national park; those which it has 
asserted by entering into international treaties; those which it may have by 
virtue of its present and prior ownership of the public domain . . . and those 
which it has acquired by purchase, gift, or condemnation from private 
owners.271 
The Department of the Interior was concerned that “[s]ince the United 
States can be said, with varying degrees of accuracy, to be the ‘owner’ of 
	
 267  Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 268  Colorado River, 424 U.S. 800, 811 (1976). 
 269  Id. at 810–12. 
 270  Id. at 812 n.18 (citing Letter from Peyton Ford, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Senator Pat McCarran (Aug. 3, 1951), in Hearings, supra note 14, at 66–67, and Letter 
from Mastin G. White, Acting Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Senator Pat McCarran 
(Aug. 3, 1951), in Hearings, supra note 14, at 67–68). 
 271  Letter from Mastin G. White to Senator Pat McCarran, supra note 270, at 67 (citations 
omitted). 
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rights of any or all of these types, it is clear to me that enactment of the bill 
could lead to a tremendous volume of unwarranted litigation.”272 
Mr. White went on to suggest an alternative approach: 
[I]t seems to me to be proper for the United States to permit itself to be joined 
as a party . . . wherever— 
  (1) in the course of a [state court] general adjudication . . . it is made to 
appear . . . that the United States is a claimant of such right and is a necessary 
party to the proceeding; that the right is claimed for the direct benefit of 
persons who, if they were themselves the claimants, would be subject to the 
laws of that State with respect to the appropriation, use, or distribution of 
water; and that the right claimed by the United States exists solely by virtue of 
the laws of the State and is required, by a statute of the United States, to be 
established by an officer or employee thereof in accordance with said laws or 
has been or is being acquired by the United States from a predecessor in 
interest whose right depends upon its having been so established . . . . 
. . . . 
  The qualifications spoken of above which should, I believe, be attached to 
such a waiver of immunity are these: (a) The waiver should in all instances be 
limited to an adjudication of those rights of the United States which depend 
solely upon their having been acquired pursuant to State law and should not 
extend to those that exist independently of such law or to those which have 
existed for a state number of years (say, 6 years); . . . (e) the waiver should not 
extend to rights asserted by the United States for or on behalf of Indians.273 
Mr. White’s comments expose a tension between the intent of the 
Congress in developing the McCarran Amendment and the executive 
branch’s interpretation of the bill’s scope. As the Supreme Court correctly 
points out,274 Mr. Veeder, the Department of Justice’s representative at the 
hearings on S. 18, predicted that: 
If we were sued we would have to prove our reclamation rights, our Indian 
rights, the Department of Defense rights . . . . 
. . . . 
  Where the United States is a party the United States of necessity must come 
in and bring in, for instance its forest service rights, its soil conservation rights, 
its Indian rights, and when that occurs you must have everyone in there or the 
decree will not be effective .275 
	
 272  Id. 
 273  Id. at 67–68. 
 274  Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 811–12 (citing Hearings, supra note 14, at 7 (statement of Mr. 
Veeder)). 
 275  Hearings, supra note 14, at 7 (statement of Mr. Veeder). 
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Although Mr. Veeder’s statement would prove prophetic, the record 
demonstrates the senators did not agree with his assessment of the 
McCarran Amendment’s scope. The Supreme Court has “cautioned against 
the danger, when interpreting a statute, of reliance upon the views of its 
legislative opponents. In their zeal to defeat the bill, they understandably 
tend to overstate its reach.”276 Instead, “[i]t is the sponsors that we look to 
when the meaning of the statutory words are in doubt.”277 The legislative 
history demonstrates that the actual sponsors of S. 18 believed its scope was 
already limited to water rights acquired by the United States pursuant to 
state law where the United States was seeking to “be given the privilege of 
immunity that the original owner wouldn’t have.”278 
Mary Wallace has pointed out that Congress’s reaction to Interior’s 
letter 
can be construed in at least two ways. One, the letter served as notice to 
Congress that the statute could be construed to include reserved rights and 
Indian water rights. Thus, by not acting to limit waiver, Congress intended that 
these rights be included. Two, Congress thought the bill already expressed the 
narrow waiver proposed by the secretary and there was no need to change the 
language.279 
Based upon the entire body of legislative history, it seems the latter 
interpretation more accurately reflects Congress’s understanding that the 
scope of the McCarran Amendment was to be very narrowly tailored to 
address the specific problem that “[t]he United States Government has 
acquired many lands and water rights in States that have the doctrine of 
prior appropriation. When these lands and water rights were acquired from 
the individuals the Government obtained no better rights than had the 
person from whom the rights were obtained.”280 In other words, the 
legislative history indicates that since Congress’s understanding was that the 
McCarran Amendment did exactly what the Department of the Interior was 
suggesting, no changes were needed to the language.281 
	
 276  Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. V. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 706, 377 
U.S. 58, 66 (1964). 
 277  Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394–95 (1951). 
 278  Hearings, supra note 14, at 8 (statement of Sen. Watkins). 
 279  Wallace, supra note 1, at 211. 
 280  S. REP. NO. 82-755, at 5–6 (1951) (emphasis added). 
 281  Further, as pointed out by Professor Abrams, “Congress justifiably could have thought 
Indian rights exempt under principles of Indian law.” Abrams, supra note 7, at 1118. “States 
have no power to regulate Indian affairs except that which is specifically granted by Congress”. 
Id. at 1118 n.51. Professor Abrams goes on to point out that “subsequent acts of Congress 
indicate hostility to state jurisdiction over Indian rights.” Id. at 1118. For this proposition, he 
cites the Senate report of 28 U.S.C. § 1362, which “vests original jurisdiction in the federal 
courts for certain types of suits brought by Indian tribes.” Abrams, supra note 7, at 1118 n. 52 
(citing S. REP. NO. 89-1507 (1966)). Abrams writes that the Senate found that “one reason for the 
act is the Indians’ fear that state courts resolve their suits unfavorably.” Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 
89-1507, at 2). “The report also credits the federal courts with ‘more expertise in deciding 
questions involving treaties with the Federal Government as well as interpreting the relevant 
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VI. REVISITING THE LANGUAGE OF THE MCCARRAN AMENDMENT 
Through the lens of the legislative history, the language of the 
McCarran Amendment comes into sharper focus. The relevant portion of the 
McCarran Amendment reads: 
  Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for 
the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, 
or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United 
States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by 
appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the 
United States is a necessary party to such suit.282 
It was the “or otherwise” language that was seized upon by the Supreme 
Court when it determined that the McCarran Amendment included reserved 
rights held for the benefit of Indian tribes.283 However, the intersection of 
basic statutory construction, the special rules of construction that apply 
specifically to Indian tribes, and the legislative history of the McCarran 
Amendment suggests a different result. 
In finding the “or otherwise” element included Indian reserved water 
rights, the Court failed to apply “the principle of ejusdem generis that would 
have required the court to conclude the ‘or otherwise’ provision does not 
encompass the adjudication of water right having a source in the powers 
over navigation and over reserved lands.”284 Ejusdem generis applies “when 
specific words are followed by a general term such as ‘or otherwise’ and 
works to limit the objects encompassed by the general term to the same 
class as those specifically enumerated.”285 The question, therefore, is whether 
“water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange” 
form a specific class and, if so, whether reserved water rights would fit into 
that class.286 
	
body of Federal law that has developed over the years.’” Id. He also points to the Act of Aug. 15, 
1953, ch. 505, § 4, 67 Stat. 588, 589 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012)), “which 
further proves congressional hostility to state jurisdiction, since it granted certain states 
jurisdiction over disputes involving Indians if the states had jurisdiction over similar suits not 
involving Indians, but specifically prohibited state jurisdiction over Indian water rights.” 
Abrams, supra note 7, at 1118 n. 52. 
 282  43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2012). 
 283  Colorado River, 424 U.S. 800, 810–11 (1976). 
 284  Wallace, supra note 1, at 211. It would perhaps be more accurate to suggest that the 
Court first rejected the application of ejusdem generis in Eagle County based upon its 
conclusion that the rights listed in section (a)(2) of the McCarran Amendment did not qualify 
section (a)(1) and then subsequently failed to apply the doctrine in Colorado River despite 
switching course and finding that “the Court [in Eagle County] held that reserved rights were 
included in those rights where the United States was ‘otherwise’ the owner.” Colorado River 424 
U.S. at 810; see also supra Part IV (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
McCarran Amendment). 
 285  Dilworth & Kirgis, supra note 81, at 110; see also NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A 
SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (7th ed. 2015). 
 286  Dilworth & Kirgis, supra note 81, at 110 (citations omitted). 
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First, as pointed out by Dilworth and Kirgis, “[t]he specific terms in the 
first sentence of the McCarran Amendment . . . would seem to form a 
class.”287 Each of the water rights listed are, by definition, water rights 
acquired under state law. The term “appropriate” in the water law context is 
derived from the prior appropriation doctrine, the primary state law water 
rights doctrine in the west. Moreover, although state law water rights are 
routinely purchased or exchanged, the Nonintercourse Act288 significantly 
limits the ability to purchase or permanently exchange reserved water 
rights.289 Indeed, as the Supreme Court highlighted in Eagle County, the 
Amendment “covers rights acquired by appropriation under state law and 
rights acquired ‘by purchase’ or ‘by exchange,’ which we assume would 
normally be appropriative rights.”290 
Second, it is doubtful that reserved rights would fit into the class 
enumerated in the McCarran Amendment. Indeed, the United States does 
not acquire, appropriate, purchase, or exchange federal reserved water 
rights. Rather, federal reserved water rights are “reserved” by the United 
	
 287  Id. at 111. The doctrine of ejusdem generis is “inapplicable if the specific enumerations 
do not all fit into one definable class.” Id. at 110. They go on to highlight that the doctrine is also 
inapplicable where “the specific terms exhaust the class or if the statute shows an intent that 
the general term be not limited to the class.” Id. at 110–11. Neither of these are applicable to the 
McCarran Amendment. First, there is no language in the McCarran Amendment that would 
show an intent that the general term be expanded beyond the class of water rights specifically 
enumerated. Second, as Dilworth and Kirgis point out, the specific terms enumerated do not 
exhaust the class “since the acquisition of water rights through ownership of riparian lands is 
not enumerated,” and, as a result, it “would seem to be at least one further method of acquiring 
water rights available to the public.” Id. at 111. The widespread presence of the Santa Margarita 
River controversy in the legislative history provides evidence that Congress intended the “or 
otherwise” language to apply to riparian rights rather than reserved rights. See supra Part V.A.3. 
California is a dual prior appropriation-riparian water rights state. TARLOCK, supra note 22, 
§ 5:11. However, most western states have abolished the riparian doctrine. Since Congress 
believed that the McCarran Amendment’s applicability “would in most instances be confined to 
those states in which the doctrine of prior appropriation is applicable,” it could be that 
Congress wanted to ensure that the McCarran Amendment would apply to riparian rights but, 
recognizing its limited applicability in the west, chose to include it in the more general “or 
otherwise” term. S. REP. NO. 82-755, at 2 (1951). 
 288  Act of June 30, 1834 (Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834), ch. 161, § 12, 4 Stat. 729, 730–31 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012)). 
 289  See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, §19.03[7][c] n.150 (“As a general proposition, the 
word ‘land’ in statutes of this type has been construed in include appurtenant waters.”); Richard 
B. Collins, The Future Course of the Winters Doctrine, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 481, 489 (1985) 
(“Water rights are real property subject to the general restraint against alienation of tribal 
land.”). Notwithstanding the significant limitations on permanently alienating reserved water 
rights, there is ample precedent to support the long-term but nonpermanent leasing of reserved 
water rights, particularly Indian reserved water rights. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, 
§19.03[7][a]–[b]. Another narrow exception to the general rule that reserved water rights may 
not be permanently alienated exists for so called Walton rights. See Colville Confederated 
Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 51 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that since an allottee is entitled to a 
pro rata share of the Tribe’s irrigation water right, a subsequent non-Indian purchaser is entitled 
to a water right for the amount of water being used by the allottee plus any water the non-
Indian puts to use within a reasonable amount of time after acquiring the property, up to the 
allotment’s pro rata entitlement). 
 290  Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 524 (1971). 
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States when it removes land from the public domain.291 Importantly, although 
the United States is able to acquire water rights pursuant to state law, the 
public at large is not able to reserve water rights under federal law.292 
Accordingly, “[e]ach of [the class] describes a method of acquisition 
available to the public at large as well as the Government. They give no 
inkling of intent to include governmental sources of water such as the 
navigation servitude or the power over reserved lands.”293 
This argument becomes substantially more forceful when coupled with 
the Indian law canons of construction.294 Although not applicable in Eagle 
County, these “eminently sound and vital canon[s]”295 of interpretation 
should have taken center stage in Colorado River when the Court considered 
the issue of whether the McCarran Amendment included Indian reserved 
water rights. The canons require statutes affecting Indian tribes “be liberally 
construed [with] doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the 
Indians.”296 Put another way, the canons require that “statutes are to be read 
to reserve Congress’ powers [to abrogate tribal rights] in the absence of a 
clear expression by Congress to the contrary.”297 Through this lens, the “or 
otherwise” language in the McCarran Amendment cannot be said to be a 
“clear expression by Congress” to abrogate tribal sovereignty over its water 
rights. At best, this language is ambiguous and its application to Indian water 
rights is doubtful. 
This analysis of basic statutory construction, as well as the Indian 
canons of construction, is consistent with the legislative history of the 
McCarran Amendment. The events that precipitated the introduction of the 
McCarran Amendment involved only state law water rights that the United 
States had appropriated298 or purchased.299 Likewise, the hearings, debates, 
and the Senate Report on S. 18 all focused almost entirely on state law water 
rights that had been purchased300 or appropriated consistent with state law.301 
In each case, the United States’ ownership, along with its claims of sovereign 
immunity, acted to preclude state court jurisdiction over state water law 
“[w]herever . . . the United States appears in a watershed,” subjecting “all the 
supposedly settled water rights . . . to review and reexamination in a court of 
the United States.”302 Proponents of the bill feared that this would eventually 
	
 291  Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 
577 (1908). 
 292  Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163–64 (1935). 
 293  See Dilworth & Kirgis, supra note 81, at 111. 
 294  See cases cited supra note 89. 
 295  Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (quoting N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 
425 U.S. 649, 655 n.7 (1976)). 
 296  Id. (quoting Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918)); see also cases 
cited supra note 89. 
 297  N. Cheyenne Tribe, 425 U.S. at 656. 
 298  See supra Part V.A.2. 
 299  See supra Part V.A.1, .3. 
 300  E.g., Hearings, supra note 14, at 8 (statement of Mr. Veeder). 
 301  Id. at 10 (statement of Sen. Watkins). 
 302  Id. at 22 (statement of Mr. Saunders). 
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lead to nullification of “the years of building the water laws of the Western 
States.”303 
In contrast to state law water rights, the reserved rights of the tribes 
were “virtual[ly] absen[t]” from the legislative history on the McCarran 
Amendment.304 As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]his omission has 
significance in the application of the canons of construction . . . as some 
mention would normally be expected if such a sweeping change in the status 
of tribal government and reservation Indians had been contemplated by 
Congress.”305 
Just the opposite, Senator Watkins stated unequivocally “[y]ou don’t 
have a general waiver in this”306 and, in fact, the few places where the 
Senators did discuss Indian reserved water rights indicate they did not 
intend for them to be included within the scope of the bill. In response to the 
statement by the representative of the Department of Justice that S. 18 
would include Indian water rights and that “[i]t doesn’t matter how [the 
United States] owns [the water right].”307 Senator Watkins responded by 
stating, “[y]es, it does. It makes quite a difference how it owns it. That is the 
point. It owns it as trustee. The beneficiaries are the Indians and they have 
prior right to the United States.”308 
Senator Watkins also noted that the bill aimed to eliminate “the 
privilege of immunity that the original owner wouldn’t have.”309 These two 
statements read together are the key to a proper construction of the 
McCarran Amendment. The bill was aimed at water rights the United States 
can acquire when acting in its proprietary capacity similar to any other 
individual seeking a water right rather than its sovereign capacity, as it 
would when reserving land and water rights for some governmental 
purpose.310 In the case of Indian tribes, the United States owns Indian 
reserved rights in trust for the tribes in its sovereign capacity and the tribes 
have sovereign immunity in their own right.311 Therefore, in the circumstance 
where the reserved rights of Indian tribes are involved, the United States 
would not have a privilege of immunity that the beneficial owners would not 
otherwise have. Accordingly, “[w]hen attention is shifted” to reserved rights 
held for the benefit of Indian tribes, “the applicability of the statute becomes 
extremely doubtful.”312 
 
	
 303  S. REP. NO. 82-755, at 5 (1951). 
 304  Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 381 (1976). 
 305  Id. 
 306  Hearings, supra note 14, at 14 (statement of Sen. Watkins). 
 307  Id. at 13 (statement of Mr. Veeder) 
 308  Id. (statement of Sen. Watkins). 
 309  Id. at 8. 
 310  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, §19.03[4]. 
 311  Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908) See cases cited supra note 57 
(discussing the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes). 
 312  Dilworth & Kirgis, supra note 81, at 110. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Eagle County, Colorado River, and 
San Carlos Apache Tribe have had dramatic and detrimental consequences 
in Indian country. By allowing state courts to determine reserved water 
rights, the Court has moved away from the “deeply rooted” federal policy of 
leaving Indian tribes free from state court jurisdiction.313 This has proven 
problematic because Indian tribes often have senior but unused water rights, 
and state courts are “ill-equipped to deal with the political pressures arrayed 
against tribal efforts to reclaim water that ha[s] been used by the non-Indian 
community.”314 As a result, tribes are now forced into “hostile” state court 
forums for the determination of their water rights “in which [they] must be 
prepared to compromise their claims.”315 
The Court’s decision that the “or otherwise” language in the McCarran 
Amendment includes reserved water rights was ultimately driven by its 
conclusion that “[t]he clear federal policy evinced by [the McCarran 
Amendment] is the avoidance of piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a 
river system.”316 However, the legislative history indicates a different policy. 
One that was designed to address a narrow but unfair and politically 
untenable situation that was occurring throughout the west at the time: the 
United States was acquiring state law water rights and subsequently refusing 
to be joined to state court proceedings seeking to either adjudicate or 
administer those rights. Little in the legislative history of the McCarran 
Amendment indicates Congress intended to deviate from its deeply rooted 
policy of “leaving the Indians free from state jurisdiction.”317 
The legislative history is packed with events leading up to the 
introduction of the McCarran Amendment that exemplify the problem the 
McCarran Amendment seems to have been designed to fix. The United 
States was purchasing state law rights in places like the Quinn River in 
Nevada and the Santa Margarita River in California. Similarly, the 
government was appropriating water rights pursuant to state law consistent 
with the Reclamation Act throughout the west. Every instance discussed in 
the available legislative history involved the United States’ acquisition of 
water rights pursuant to state law. The acquisition of these state law water 
rights by the United States was compromising the states’ ability to manage 
water within their borders because federal claims of sovereign immunity 
was effectively precluding state court enforcement of state water laws. As a 
result, water users in the West were becoming increasingly alarmed that “the 
long years of travail through which the water laws of our Western States 
have pased [sic] . . . have been in vain.”318 
	
 313  Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S.786, 789 (1945). 
 314  McElroy & Davis, supra note 7, at 599–600. 
 315  Blumm et al., The Mirage of Indian Reserved Water Rights, supra note 7, at 1161. 
 316  Colorado River, 424 U.S. 810, 823 (1976). 
 317  Rice, 324 U.S. at 789. 
 318  Hearings, supra note 14, at 48 (statement of Mr. Mathews). 
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Perhaps most illuminating are the statements of Senators McCarran and 
Watkins, cosponsors of the McCarran Amendment. Although the executive 
branch, through the Departments of Justice and the Interior, prophesized the 
McCarran Amendment could be interpreted as a general waiver, including 
the rights of Indian tribes, there is little evidence in the legislative history 
that indicates the Senators shared their view. The only statements made by 
the Senators regarding Indians signals they did not view the McCarran 
Amendment to include Indian reserved water rights. 
Instead, the problem, according to Senator McCarran, was that 
during the past 15 or 18 years, [the United States] has acquired on the various 
natural streams of the West holdings, in real estate which was formerly taken 
up by private citizens and in connection with which they, as private citizens, 
diverted water from the natural streams and applied it to the land.319 
The McCarran Amendment was passed into law to address these water 
rights. Senator Watkins argued that 
if the United States is going to come in there and take advantage of the laws 
and acquire water rights in trust for private individuals, private 
corporations . . . [it should go] the full distance, and not only claim[] all the 
assets that go along but takes a few of the liabilities and subject[] itself to the 
courts there and ha[ve] those rights determined. . . . When you get into the field 
of becoming trustee for private individuals, then you ought to be willing to 
submit to the same jurisdiction the individuals would be if they owned the 
property and had the legal title as well as the equitable title.320 
The confluence of the basic rules of statutory construction, the canons 
of construction applied to Indian tribes, and the legislative history 
demonstrate that “the McCarran Amendment was meant to be interpreted 
narrowly, not broadly.”321 Indeed, the true policy underlying the McCarran 
Amendment seems to have had nothing to do with Indian tribes who have 
sovereign immunity independent of the United States or their rights, which 
are reserved by the United States in its sovereign capacity. Instead, the 
purpose of the bill was to address the problem that “Congress has not 
removed the bar of immunity . . . in suits wherein water rights acquired 
under State law are drawn in question.”322 The Senators wanted to make sure 
the United States accepted the “disabilities as well as . . . the benefits” of 
these rights.323 The McCarran Amendment “was introduced for the very 
purpose of correcting this situation and the evils growing out of such 
immunity.”324 
 
	
 319  97 CONG. REC. 12,948 (1951) (statement of Sen. McCarran). 
 320  Hearings, supra note 14, at 15 (statement of Sen. Watkins). 
 321  Wallace, supra note 1, at 210. 
 322  S. REP. NO. 82-755, at 5 (1951) (emphasis added). 
 323  Hearings, supra note 14, at 44 (statement of Rep. Yorty). 
 324  S. REP. NO. 82-755, at 5 (1951) (emphasis added). 
